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Administrative law needs to adapt to adaptive management. Adaptive 
management is a structured decisionmaking method, the core of which is a 
multistep, iterative process for adjusting management measures to changing 
circumstances or new information about the effectiveness of prior measures or 
the system being managed. It has been identified as a necessary or best- 
practices component of regulation in a broad range of fields, including drug and 
medical-device warnings, financial system regulation, social welfare programs, 
and natural resources management. Nevertheless, many of the agency decisions 
advancing these policies remain subject to the requirements of either the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act or the states’ parallel statutes. Adaptive 
management theorists have identified several features of such administrative 
law requirements—especially public participation, judicial review, and 
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finality—as posing barriers to true adaptive management, but they have put 
forward no proposals for reform.   
This Article represents the first effort in adaptive management theory 
to go beyond complaining about the handcuffs administrative law puts on 
adaptive management and to suggest a solution. The Article begins by 
explaining the theory and limits of adaptive management to emphasize that it 
is not appropriate for all, or even most, agency decisionmaking. For appropriate 
applications, however, we argue that conventional administrative law has 
unnecessarily shackled effective use of adaptive management. We show that 
through a specialized “adaptive management track” of administrative 
procedures, the core values of administrative law can be implemented in ways 
that much better allow for adaptive management. Going further, we propose 
and explain draft model legislation that would create such a track for the 
specific types of agency decisionmaking that could benefit from adaptive 
management. 
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The administrative style that has characterized American 
public law from the New Deal to the 1980s has been out of 
favor in recent years. 
—Charles Sabel and William Simon1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the never-ending project to build a better regulatory state 
mousetrap, two of the most seductive reinvention models to emerge over 
the past few decades have been market-based regulation2 and adaptive 
management.3 Representative of two broad and opposing thrusts of 
regulatory reform, one advocating “minimalism”4 and the other 
 
 1. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (2011). For a summary and critique of regulatory reform 
models prevailing throughout the last few decades, see Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in 
Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 634 (2012). 
 2. For a sweeping review of the concepts and history of market-based regulation, see 
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 3 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 
2007) [hereinafter MOVING TO MARKETS]. 
 3. For the seminal description of adaptive management, see INT’L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS. 
ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 1 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978). 
For a more recent synthesis of adaptive management theory, see PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 
2002). See generally infra Part I.A (tracing the history of adaptive management). 
 4. Minimalism “seeks to ground policy design in economic concepts and market practices, 
and to minimize frontline administrative discretion and popular participation in administration.” 
Sabel & Simon, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
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“experimentalism,”5 market-based regulation and adaptive 
management originate from the same premise but move in starkly 
different directions. This Article examines the path that adaptive 
management has taken and proposes how to steer it out of a dead end 
by changing the inner workings of administrative law. 
The starting point for both regulatory reform models is the 
depiction of administrative agencies as having become boxed into a 
decisionmaking process that depends heavily on a culture of 
comprehensive rational planning and prescriptive regulation.6 The 
dominant decisionmaking method used to implement this regime relies 
heavily on two related attributes: (1) the use of “front-end” analytical 
tools comprehensively conducted and concluded prior to finalizing the 
decision, and (2) the assumption of a robust capacity to predict and 
assess the market and nonmarket impacts of any proposed action.7 
However, this approach constrains agency flexibility by demanding 
hyperdetailed predecisional impact assessments, intense public 
participation during the decisionmaking process, and postdecision hard 
look judicial review.8 The combined effect of this procedural gauntlet, 
codified in large part through the federal Administrative Procedure Act 
 
 5. Experimentalism’s “governing norm in institutional design is reliability—the capacity for 
learning and adaptation.” Id. at 55. 
 6. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 424, 437 (2010) (discussing the central attributes of the modern agency-decisionmaking 
process). 
 7. For example, regulations promulgated under the Endangered Species Act require federal 
agencies, prior to carrying out, funding, or authorizing an action, to “[e]valuate the effects of the 
action and cumulative effects” and decide “whether the action, taken together with cumulative 
effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3)–
(4) (2009). Cumulative effects are “those effects of future State or private activities, not involving 
Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area.” Id. § 402.02. In 
other words, the agency must decide, once and for all, whether an action taken today will 
jeopardize a species at some point in the future. The agency may revisit its decision only if the 
action remains subject to continuing federal control and either new information or modifications 
of the action present effects that were not previously considered. See id. § 402.16 (discussing when 
reinitiation of formal consultation is required).  
 8. Professors Sidney Shapiro and Robert Glicksman have produced a rich body of 
scholarship exploring the conventional “front-end” approach to agency decisionmaking. See SIDNEY 
A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK, at x (2003) (suggesting that 
pragmatism, rather than utilitarianism, is the “appropriate baseline from which to design and 
implement risk regulation”); Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation 
Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2004) (advocating a shift in focus 
from “front-end” regulatory adjustment to “back-end” regulatory improvements, including use of 
adaptive management); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, 
ENVTL. L.F., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 42, 42 (“Instead of the increased ‘front end’ examination of 
regulations, such as cost-benefits analysis, that is pushed by the critics—and is causing stagnation 
of rulemaking—a pragmatic approach would look at a regulation’s actual ‘back end’ effects after 
promulgation and make incremental adjustments as needed.”). 
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(“APA”)9 and its state counterparts, has been to channel self-preserving 
agencies into cramming all that could possibly be thought or dreamed 
about actions they carry out, fund, or authorize into single-shot, all-
encompassing decision extravaganzas. Especially in rulemaking, this 
impetus toward up-front comprehensiveness strongly encourages 
agencies to steamroll their decisions through public-comment scrutiny 
and judicial review litigation and then never look back.10 Reopening or 
reconsidering a completed and judicially blessed decision in such an 
environment is anathema to any sane agency. 
To be sure, even under the pressure of these external “rational-
instrumental” constraints on agency discretion,11 the front-end mode of 
administrative decisionmaking does produce agency decisions sooner or 
later, even decisions of momentous import and magnitude. However, it 
cannot be denied that this mode of agency decisionmaking has also been 
subjected to withering criticisms that it ossifies agency practices, 
politicizes agency decisions, stultifies flexibility, and generally makes 
administrative agencies unadministrative.12 
 
 9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2012). 
 10. See J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 21, 34–53 (2005) (noting that most administrative agencies are increasingly required to 
engage in predecisional activity geared towards public participation and judicial review before 
promulgating a rule or adjudicating a decision).  
 11. Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the 
Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464–65 (2012) (critiquing the “rational-
instrumental” model of administrative decisionmaking and proposing a “deliberative-constitutive” 
model based in more iterative, discursive use of professional agency judgment); see also William 
Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2332079 (providing an 
overview of “the most dysfunctional features of canonical [administrative law] doctrine – both the 
excessively burdensome ones and the excessively lax ones” and contending that they all derive 
from a “highly limited and increasingly anachronistic conception of public administration.”) 
 12. See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal 
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 393–95 (2000) (pointing out criticisms that hard look review 
has ossified the informal rulemaking process); Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood 
Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2011) (noting that 
“regulated industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are willing to spend millions of dollars 
to shape public opinion and influence powerful political actors to exert political pressure on 
agencies”); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) (noting that the informal rulemaking process has become increasingly 
“rigid and burdensome”); Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 100–45 (2004) (providing a broad critique of the 
public participation–judicial review model of administrative law); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying 
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483–89 (1997) (discussing criticisms that the informal 
rulemaking process has become “unnecessarily cumbersome”).  
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Market-based regulation, a darling of minimalism theory, 
responds to these criticisms by replacing some measure of agency 
discretion with the dynamic organizing power of markets and economic 
incentives.13 The job of agencies in this approach is to set up the 
framework in which market forces can operate and then sit back and 
watch the elegance of economic incentives drive market-participant 
behavior in the desired direction.14 In environmental regulation, for 
example, so-called pollution cap-and-trade systems have the agency 
prescribe aggregate, industry-wide pollution loads; allocate initial 
pollution units to industry participants; and set up the rules for trading 
those units; from there, however, the market defines the unit price and 
drives trading behavior.15 Similarly, conservation-banking programs 
allow one landowner to destroy natural resources, such as wetlands or 
endangered species’ habitat, and offset the lost ecological values by 
purchasing resource credits in an open market from another landowner 
who has created or enhanced similar resources.16 The point of such 
programs is specifically to remove agency discretion from decisions 
about trading partners, prices of credits, and other features taken over 
by the regulatory market, the theory being that the market can perform 
those functions more efficiently and effectively than can agency 
expertise and intervention.17 Indeed, with the agency removed from the 
picture, at least partially, the market-directed portion of the process 
also effectively supplants public participation and judicial review—the 
market is the public, and the market does not get it wrong, so judicial 
review is unnecessary. At least, that’s the theory of market-based 
regulation. 
 
 13. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 1, at 57 (noting that “minimalists look to economics for 
norms and practices that obviate official discretion”).  
 14. Notably, even as far back as 1975, legal scholars considered the elimination of 
administrative agencies and a return to the pure market as a possible solution to increasing agency 
discretion. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1689–93 (1975). 
 15. See A. Denny Ellerman, Are Cap-and-Trade Programs More Environmentally Effective 
than Conventional Regulation?, in MOVING TO MARKETS, supra note 2, at 48 (comparing cap-and-
trade to prescriptive regulation); Karen Fisher-Vanden & Sheila Olmstead, Moving Pollution 
Trading from Air to Water: Potential, Problems, and Prognosis, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 148 (2013) 
(examining air- and water-pollutant trading programs). 
 16. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, “No Net Loss”: Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection, 
in MOVING TO MARKETS, supra note 2, at 323 (describing wetlands banking). 
 17. See Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad, Prescriptive Environmental Regulations Versus 
Market-Based Incentives, in MOVING TO MARKETS, supra note 2, at 3 (market-based theorists posit 
that “[n]ot only would market instruments be easier and cheaper to administer than prescriptive 
regulation, they would harness the profit motive in the service of environmental protection and 
dramatically reduce implementation costs”).  
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Championing experimentalism, adaptive management offers a 
much different path away from the conventional front-end model of 
decisionmaking. The key move is not to carve away agency discretion, 
as market-based regulation does, but to add to it, albeit in a vastly 
different form compared to the front-end model.18 The idea of adaptive 
management is that agencies should be free to make more decisions, 
but that the timing of those decisions is spread out into a continuous 
process that makes differentiating between the “front end” and the 
“back end” of decisionmaking much less relevant.19 Rather than make 
one grand decision and move on, agencies employing adaptive 
management engage in a program of iterative decisionmaking following 
a structured, multistep protocol: (1) definition of the problem, (2) 
determination of goals and objectives for management, (3) 
determination of the baseline, (4) development of conceptual models, (5) 
selection of future actions, (6) implementation and management 
actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step (1).20 
Formal, time-limited public participation junctures, such as the notice-
and-comment process of conventional APA-style administrative 
rulemaking, are not a component of adaptive management; rather, 
public input is derived through an emphasis on more loosely defined 
processes for “stakeholder involvement” and multiparty 
“collaborative planning.”21 With deep roots in natural resources 
 
 18. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 1, at 78 (explaining that experimentalism involves 
discretion distributed through a more decentralized structure but with centralized coordination); 
see also Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, “Improving” Project XL: Helping Adaptive 
Management to Work Within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 155, 166–67 (1999) (arguing that 
legislatively allowed adaptive management would increase agency discretion as compared to 
conventional administrative regimes).  
 19. See Lawrence Susskind et al., A Critical Assessment of Collaborative Adaptive 
Management in Practice, 49 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 47, 47 (2012) (“Rather than making a single 
definitive decision despite information gaps or uncertainty about the systems involved, [adaptive 
management] emphasizes learning via the careful monitoring of provisional strategies and 
changing conditions, and incremental adjustments in light of new information.”). 
 20. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, 
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN 332–35 (2004) (explaining 
the adaptive management decisionmaking process). Adaptive management theorists propose 
many configurations of the iterative steps. See infra Part II.A. This protocol is taken from work by 
the National Research Council’s work on endangered species issues in the Klamath River basin in 
the Pacific Northwest. In the interests of full disclosure, Professor Ruhl served on the so-called 
“Klamath Committee,” including its work on defining and applying adaptive management.  
 21. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE 
CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATION 1–2 (2011), available at www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/adaptive_ 
management/plan.pdf (presenting an adaptive management plan for implementation of an air 
pollutant trading program); see also Susskind et al., supra note 19, at 49–50 (stressing the 
importance of “collaborative planning” in adaptive management); Byron K. Williams, Adaptive 
Management of Natural Resources—Framework and Issues, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1346, 1348 (2011) 
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management theory,22 the adaptive management protocol has begun to 
make inroads in public lands management in particular,23 though it has 
been applied or proposed in other policy contexts, including pollution 
control,24 financial regulation,25 environmental impact assessment,26 
public health and safety,27 civil rights,28 and social welfare.29 
Market-based regulation and adaptive management have by no 
means taken over the administrative state. Rather, they have been used 
more opportunistically than holistically, stepping in strategically where 
conventional front-end decisionmaking has failed or needs help. Indeed, 
they have been used that way in unison in some cases. For example, 
when the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) came under heated attack in 
the mid-1990s as too blunt a regulatory tool, its implementing agencies 
used carefully targeted doses of market-based regulation and adaptive 
management to make the regulatory programs more nuanced and 
 
(identifying “stakeholder involvement” as “[a] key step in any adaptive management application”). 
For elaboration on what these are, see infra Part II.A. 
 22. See HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 3 (2011) (“Since the mid-1990s, the concept of adaptive management has 
held a prominent place in natural resource management policy in the United States . . . .”). For the 
seminal works linking adaptive management with natural resources management policy, see 
Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of America on the Scientific 
Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 666 (1996), and R. Edward 
Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 29–31 (1994). 
 23. See Jamie McFadden et al., Evaluating the Efficacy of Adaptive Management Approaches: 
Is There a Formula for Success?, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1354, 1357–58 (2011) (showing a sharp 
upward trend of discussion of adaptive management in major natural resources management 
journals since 2000); Susskind et al., supra note 19, at 47 (“Collaborative adaptive management 
(CAM) is widely touted as the best way to handle natural resource management in the face of 
uncertainty, change and conflict.”). 
 24. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 169 (discussing an innovative pollution-control 
program and reporting that the program was supported by the fact that “important constituencies 
within all [stakeholder] groups understand that adaptive management holds great promise for the 
improvement of environmental compliance regimes”). 
 25. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged 
Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1302–04 (2012) (proposing an iterative regulatory regime 
for financial institutions). 
 26. See Julie Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium View of 
Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 894 (2006) (discussing the 
integration of adaptive management principles in predecisional environmental-impact 
assessments). 
 27. See William H. Simon, Democracy and Organization: The Further Reformation of 
American Administrative Law 35–41 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-322, 2012) (discussing the Workforce Investment Act of 1998). 
 28. See id. (discussing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003). 
 29. See id. (discussing the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011). 
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flexible at the edges.30 Although still dominated by front-end decisions 
about the status of species for protection and the conditions under 
which federal and nonfederal actions can take place in habitats of 
protected species, the regulatory program has evolved considerably—
and the statute has survived the political assaults—thanks largely to 
the administrative reforms.31 
As between the two approaches, market-based regulation has a 
much longer and more tested track record than does adaptive 
management, although the jury is still out on its performance in 
numerous applied settings.32 Concerns with market-based approaches 
include, for example, whether pollution trading allows “hot spots” of 
intense local pollution to form33 and whether agencies can balance the 
goals of the statute with the administrative goal of maintaining a viable 
trading market.34 In general, however, most of these concerns can (in 
theory) be addressed through further tinkering with the regulatory-
market frameworks. That is to say, the basic theory of market-based 
regulation is firmly in place, and the principles for its design and 
application in the field are by now well understood, even if not always 
effectively executed.35 
By contrast, the adaptive management trial has only recently 
begun, and it is moving slowly and with mixed results. Putting adaptive 
management into practice has proven far more difficult than its early 
theorists expected.36 One problem has been translating the theory into 
 
 30. See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the 
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 374–400 (1998) (contemporaneously examining 
the Babbitt-era reforms). 
 31. See J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in the Post-Babbittonian Era—Are 
There Any?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 419, 430–38 (2004) (reflecting on the Babbitt-era 
reforms). 
 32. See Freeman & Kolstad, supra note 17, at 3–15 (providing a comprehensive assessment 
of the first twenty years of applied market-based regulation in the environmental policy context); 
Lawrence Goulder, Markets for Pollution Allowances: What Are the (New) Lessons?, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 87, 87–88 (2013) (tracing “cap-and-trade” theory to the 1960s and its policy applications 
from the 1970s forward).  
 33. See Ellerman, supra note 15, at 51–52 (examining the “hot spots” issue). 
 34. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 16, at 335–39 (examining the difficulties of maintaining 
regulatory markets). 
 35. See Fisher-Vanden & Olmstead, supra note 15, 157–64 (defining criteria for successful 
pollutant-trading programs); Goulder, supra note 32, at 100 (stating that cap-and-trade and 
pollution taxes, “[w]hen well designed, either form of emissions pricing will offer several 
advantages over conventional forms of regulation”). 
 36. See Craig R. Allen et al., Adaptive Management for a Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENVTL. 
MGMT. 1339, 1341 (2011) (noting that “despite an illustrious theoretical history there has 
remained imperfect realization of adaptive management in [the] real world”); Craig R. Allen & 
Lance H. Gunderson, Pathology and Failure in the Design and Implementation of Adaptive 
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the legal context of agency practice. It is easy for politicians to command 
agencies to “go practice adaptive management” and leave it to others to 
figure out how.37 Agencies working in good faith to follow through on 
the promise of adaptive management, however, have found themselves 
facing a public suspicious of seemingly unbounded agency discretion38 
and courts unaccustomed to the “dial twiddling” of adaptive 
management’s decisionmaking protocol.39 Agencies thus are caught 
between a rock and a hard place—they must implement adaptive 
management to keep in step with dominant management decision 
theory, but when they do, they face a tough audience in the public and 
judicial forums. 
The result has been agencies perfecting and practicing what has 
been dubbed “a/m lite,” a watered-down form of adaptive management 
agencies use to play it safe.40 The first step in an agency’s descent into 
 
Management, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1379, 1380 (2011) (“The implementation of adaptive 
management has proven to be difficult.”); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered 
Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 
WASHBURN L.J. 50, 54 (2001) (noting that “skepticism about adaptive management comes from the 
lack of success stories to date”); McFadden et al., supra note 23, at 1358 (“While managers in the 
field of natural-resources generally acknowledge adaptive management as an appropriate 
approach for managing complex ecosystems, the managers may experience difficulty in proceeding 
with the adaptive management process to the implementation stage.”); Susskind et al., supra note 
19, at 47 (“[T]he results have been mixed, with many efforts falling short of the resource 
management results that were expected.”); Carl J. Walters, Is Adaptive Management Helping to 
Solve Fisheries Problems?, 36 AMBIO 304, 304 (2007) (arguing that adaptive management has 
“been radically less successful than one would expect from its intuitive appeal”). 
 37. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,099, 23,101–03 (May 12, 2009) (directing 
the EPA to draft pollution-control strategies for the Chesapeake Bay watershed that are “based on 
sound science and reflect adaptive management principles,” while also directing the Departments 
of the Interior and Commerce to use “adaptive management to plan, monitor, evaluate, and adjust 
environmental management actions” in the Chesapeake Bay watershed, but not defining any of 
these concepts). Alejandro Camacho has outlined the core substantive features of an “adaptive 
governance framework as part of organic adaptation planning legislation.” Alejandro E. Camacho, 
Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning 
Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 72–76 (2009). Our focus in this Article is on the procedural 
features.  
 38. DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 3 (“[E]nvironmentalists argue that adaptive 
management places too much open-ended discretion in the hands of agency managers.”); Melinda 
Harm Benson & Ahjond S. Garmestani, Embracing Panarchy, Building Resilience and Integrating 
Adaptive Management through a Rebirth of the National Environmental Policy Act, 92 J. ENVTL. 
MGMT. 1420, 1422 (2011) (“[C]ritics of adaptive management view it as an excuse to allow agencies 
an unreasonable amount of discretion . . . .”); Courtny Schultz & Martin Nie, Decision-making 
Triggers, Adaptive Management, and Natural Resources Law and Planning, 52 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 443, 449–51 (2012) (discussing why the “discretion-based approach to adaptive management did 
not sit well with environmental groups”).  
 39. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 439–40 (describing adaptive management as “dial 
twiddling” and analyzing the poor reception it has received in courts). 
 40. See id. at 431–43 (describing agencies’ practice of a/m lite). 
1 - Craig&Ruhl PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2014  4:27 PM 
2014] ADMIN LAW & ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 11 
a/m lite is to dilute the definition of adaptive management into a long-
winded abstraction of “learning while doing.”41 From there, the agency 
can pepper its rules, permits, and policies with promises to employ 
adaptive management while making no firm commitments to do 
anything in particular.42 At its best, therefore, a/m lite simply 
supplements agencies’ front-end decisions with bold promises to adapt 
unspecified parameters of the decision in the unspecified future 
through unspecified methods when unspecified conditions arise.43 At its 
worst, a/m lite allows agencies to defer hard decisions indefinitely by 
shifting them into the adaptive management black box.44 Like many 
plans, an adaptive management plan of a/m lite origin is more likely to 
find itself sitting on the shelf than springing into action. 
This false start in adaptive management practice has led some 
commentators to ask whether implementing adaptive management 
consistent with its full theoretic model is truly possible for regulatory 
agencies, or whether the whole idea will be ground to pieces by the 
administrative state’s demands for comprehensive predecisional impact 
assessments, relentless public participation, and routine access to 
probing judicial review.45 If agencies are committed to adaptive 
 
 41. For example, the Department of the Interior defines adaptive management as a decision-
making process that  
promotes flexible decision making that can be adjusted in the face of uncertainties as 
outcomes from management actions and other events become better understood. 
Careful monitoring of these outcomes both advances scientific understanding and helps 
adjust policies or operations as part of an iterative learning process . . . . It is not a ‘trial 
and error’ process, but rather emphasizes learning while doing.  
BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR 
TECHNICAL GUIDE, at v (2009). For similar examples, see Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 431–
33. 
 42. For example, rules the Army Corps of Engineers has adopted to implement the Clean 
Water Act’s wetland compensatory mitigation program require permit applicants to develop an 
“adaptive management plan” to “guide decisions for revising compensatory mitigation plans and 
implementing measures to address both foreseeable and unforeseen circumstances that adversely 
affect compensatory mitigation success.” 33 C.F.R. § 332.4(c)(12) (2013). Yet the rules do not go 
further in explaining how these plans are to be implemented, leaving it to the local Army Corps 
“district engineer, in consultation with the responsible party (and other federal, tribal, state, and 
local agencies, as appropriate), [to] determine the appropriate measures.” Id. § 332.7(c)(3). The 
upshot of the rule is that the adaptive management plan will be used when deemed necessary, at 
which time the district engineer, permittee, and other interested parties will figure out how to 
adapt. For similar examples, see Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 433–36.  
 43. See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 11 (“One of the most significant weaknesses of 
adaptive management to date has been that agencies have promised future adaptation but not 
delivered it.”). 
 44. See id. at 3 (stating that adaptive management is “at worst a smokescreen for unbounded 
agency discretion and a wobbly commitment to program objectives”). 
 45. Craig Allen and his colleagues have noted, for example, that:  
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management but unable as a practical matter to move it past a/m lite, 
one has to wonder whether these core features of conventional 
administrative law—the features that incentivize front-end 
decisionmaking—aren’t in fact the problem that needs to give ground. 
The bottom line may be that either we can leave administrative law 
untouched, in which case a/m lite is about as far as adaptive 
management will progress, or we can design an alternative 
administrative procedure model that enables agencies to practice 
adaptive management in its purer form. Indeed, a recent survey of 
adaptive management practitioners revealed that most of them believe 
implementation of adaptive management has reached this crossroads.46 
Before casting stones on administrative law as the barrier to 
moving beyond a/m lite, though, one must also consider whether 
adaptive management’s acolytes have oversold its virtues and set legal 
process up for the fall. Other constraints stand in the way of effective 
 
Legal certainty does not mesh well with environmental unpredictability. . . . The 
certainty of law and institutional rigidity often limit the experimentation that is 
necessary for adaptive management[,]” and the “adversarial character of 
administrative law, combined with the need for certainty (e.g., procedural rules) in the 
larger realm of American law, is likely incompatible with adaptive management.  
Allen et al., supra note 36, at 1343 (citations omitted). Professor Angelo adds:  
Another challenge of adaptive management is that it may be difficult to incorporate 
substantial public participation. . . . If we need to wait to convene all stakeholders and 
achieve consensus or near consensus before every action, we simply will not be able to 
have the quick reaction time necessary for adaptive management.  
Mary Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological Resilience, 
87 NEB. L. REV. 950, 1001–02 (2009). Finally, Professor Karkkainen has argued that: 
[T]he adversarial and litigious character of contemporary administrative law coupled 
with its overall tendency toward nitpicking enforcement of fixed ‘command-and-control’ 
rules—especially procedural rules, which are singularly easy for courts to enforce—and 
its reluctance to countenance uncertainty and lack of information as the basis for 
agency decisionmaking are all profoundly at odds with the very concept of adaptive 
management.  
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 73 (2005); see also Ruhl, supra note 10, at 34–36 (identifying 
disconnects between adaptive management and conventional administrative procedure); Brian 
Walker et al., Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social–Ecological Systems, 9 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2004, at art. 5 (citations omitted), available at http://www.ecology 
andsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/ (“Adaptive management, widely and deservedly promoted as a 
necessary basis for sustainable development, has frequently failed because the existing governance 
structures have not allowed it to function effectively.”). 
 46. Professors Benson and Stone report that practitioners do feel hampered by legal and 
institutional constraints. See Melinda Harm Benson & Asako Stone, Practitioner Perceptions of 
Adaptive Management Implementation in the United States, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 3, 2013, at 
art. 32, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss3/art32/ (finding well over seventy 
percent not only believed that constraints exist and could specifically name one or more example 
of a legal constraint on their work implementing adaptive management; at the same time, finding 
“practitioners are generally optimistic about the potential for institutional reform”).  
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administrative agency adaptive management, not the least of which are 
funding, politics, uncertainty, data scarcity, and lack of institutional 
capacity.47 Working to get past a/m lite in some contexts thus may be 
asking the agency to hit its head against a wall. Even in the best of such 
circumstances, moreover, adaptive management also may not be suited 
to regulatory contexts (1) in which long-term stability of decisions is 
important, such as child labor controls; (2) where decisions simply can’t 
easily be adjusted once implemented, such as where to locate a 
completed highway intersection; or (3) where it is essential that an 
agency retain firm authority to say “yes” or “no” and leave it at that. 
Hurling the words “adaptive management” at a regulatory problem 
thus asks for failure if either the nature of the problem or its practical 
context is not well suited for adaptive decisionmaking. 
We recognize these limitations on adaptive management and 
thus the need for reformers first to sort through the rhetoric of adaptive 
management to define where it could truly be usefully and practicably 
implemented. Only then can one evaluate how much of a barrier 
conventional administrative law poses to doing so. If adaptive 
management is promising in some decisionmaking contexts, however, 
and administrative law the principal obstacle to fulfilling that promise, 
then it is appropriate to ask what an alternative administrative process 
would have to look like to unleash adaptive management’s potential. 
How far would the alternative need to deviate from conventional 
administrative law, and would there be unacceptable tradeoffs with 
other values administrative law serves to fulfill? An informed 
deliberation on the practice of adaptive management in the 
administrative state must address these questions—in short, to ask 
whether it is administrative law, not the pursuit of adaptive 
management, that is maladaptive, and if so, what to do.48 Yet, while 
there is broad agreement among adaptive management theorists on the 
first point—administrative law has become a barrier to effective 
 
 47. See Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript on file with author) (identifying numerous barriers to 
adaptive management besides administrative law); Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation 
Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2007) 
(critiquing the use of adaptive management in the Endangered Species Act); Doremus, supra note 
36, at 50–52 (identifying challenges for adaptive management in the administration of the 
Endangered Species Act); Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of 
Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1239 (2008) 
(arguing that adaptive management by agencies pays insufficient attention to substantive goals). 
 48. As Brad Karkkainen has put it, to consider adaptive management seriously, one must 
suspend the premise that “administrative law w[as] somehow immutable and eternal, or at least 
of constitutional stature, rather than just another statutory and judge-made legal artifact that 
may prove maladaptive at some point.” See Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 69. 
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adaptive management—what to do about it has not received focused 
attention. 
This Article represents the first effort in adaptive management 
theory to go beyond complaining about the handcuffs imposed by 
administrative law and suggest a solution. Theorists (including us) 
have proposed the idea of a specialized procedural “track” for adaptive 
management,49 but the devil is in the details. Here, we propose the 
details. To initiate that inquiry, Part II of this Article grounds the 
theory of adaptive management in the real world conditions under 
which its pure practice is most likely to be of value. Having identified 
those conditions, Part III then focuses on the values of conventional 
administrative law and the obstacles they pose for agency 
implementation of true adaptive management. Using our proposed 
Model Adaptive Management Procedure Act (“MAMPA”) as the 
analytical foundation, Part IV closes by working through the provisions 
of a new administrative law track for adaptive management that 
balances those values with the values and practical needs of adaptive 
management. 
Before going into details, however, some caveats are in order. 
First, our proposed adaptive management track is simply an 
alternative set of administrative procedures to those found in the 
current APA and its state counterparts, designed to facilitate agency 
implementation of proper adaptive management in appropriate (not all) 
regulatory contexts. We do not propose far-ranging fixes to more 
general administrative law problems, such as agency recalcitrance in 
implementing statutory mandates or abuse of agency discretion, even 
though we admit from the outset that they are theoretically at least as 
likely to occur on the adaptive management track as in any other 
administrative law context. Nevertheless, because the adaptive 
management track accords a participating agency more ongoing 
discretion than typical front-end agency decisionmaking, we purposely 
have designed our adaptive management track so that an agency’s 
decision to take it must be considered, deliberate, and—to the extent 
that procedural constraints can so guarantee—committed to following 
in good faith proper adaptive management procedures. 
 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 75 (“One might envision administrative law proceeding on two tracks[,]” 
one being a “familiar ‘fixed rule’ track” and the other an “adaptive management track.”); see also 
Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for 
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17, 66–67 (2010) (suggesting the 
need to “restructure those legal safeguards and allow administrative agencies more breathing 
room”); J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 406–07 (2002) (calling 
for greater discretion and more deferential and reduced judicial review for agencies involved in 
adaptive management).  
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Second, we propose general procedures—like those in the APA—
that should be able to govern a wide variety of agency types (financial 
and business, health and public safety, environmental, consumer 
protection, etc.) in a wide variety of regulatory contexts. Nevertheless, 
we acknowledge that the relevant legislature might want to tailor these 
procedures for particular agencies or regulatory contexts, as is true in 
current administrative law. For example, a legislature may deem 
desirable recurrent peer review of how an agency implements adaptive 
management for certain agencies or for longer-term projects. Our 
proposal is not intended to short-circuit such legislative tailoring any 
more than the APA stymies Congress in adding procedural 
modifications to particular statutes; rather, like the APA, our proposed 
statute provides a general procedural template that legislatures remain 
free to tweak as they deem appropriate for particular agencies or areas 
of law. 
Finally, other than identifying the general context within which 
adaptive management is likely to be effective, we confine our analysis 
to the administrative procedure of adaptive management. We do not 
suggest with any specificity where and when adaptive management 
should be used as a matter of policy, nor do we outline how a legislature 
might craft a statute conferring substantive authority to an agency to 
practice adaptive management. The APA has more than adequately 
demonstrated that procedure matters; hence, we believe defining the 
procedure of adaptive management is as important as defining its 
substance. 
Our singular focus is, in other words, on process. Adaptive 
management is a structured decisionmaking process in need of a 
structured legal process. All adaptive management theorists and 
practitioners, and all administrative procedure theorists and 
practitioners, have a stake in the project of designing administrative 
law for adaptive management. To be sure, adaptive management is not 
a panacea for the administrative state, yet it is difficult to conceive how 
regulation can function effectively in the future without making true 
adaptive management available to agencies in contexts where it is 
likely to be useful. The mediums of regulation—technology, the 
environment, public health, financial markets, and so on—are 
themselves highly adaptive and dynamic. Moreover, forces on the 
horizon, such as climate change and increasing globalization, will 
further destabilize regulatory contexts. 
The question thus is not whether regulation should be adaptive, 
but rather where and how to make it so. Early indications from the 
adaptive management project are that some of its chief obstacles are 
the entrenched features of conventional administrative law. To move 
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adaptive management forward in its appropriate applications, 
therefore, we must revisit administrative law—we must craft an 
administrative law for adaptive management. This Article is intended 
to invigorate an active dialogue for that purpose. 
II. THE THEORY AND LIMITS OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
If you plug “adaptive management” into a web browser, you will 
find over 800,000 sites to explore, including government publications 
and websites, academic articles, nongovernmental organizations 
devoted to adaptive management, and some pretty elaborate diagrams 
of what adaptive management is supposed to look like in practice. 
Clearly, the idea has caught on. Nevertheless, even its most fervent 
advocates do not propose adaptive management as appropriate for all 
regulatory contexts. Indeed, some proponents express concern that 
adaptive management is being oversold and thus set up for failure. As 
one prominent adaptive management theorist has suggested,  
[T]he concept of learning by doing is so intuitively appealing that the phrase “adaptive 
management” has been applied almost indiscriminately, with the result that many 
projects fail to achieve expected improvements. In many instances, that failure may have 
less to do with the approach itself than with the inappropriate contexts in which it is 
applied.50 
Adaptive management theorists have thus increasingly focused 
on describing success within a particular set of conditions. From there, 
practical, political, and normative limits further constrain adaptive 
management’s application. Given our purpose in this Article to 
formulate procedural rules governing adaptive management, it is 
important that we draw on this body of work to first clarify the 
substantive contexts within which the procedures would apply. 
A. Successful Adaptive Management in Theory 
The theoretical origins of adaptive management can be traced to 
business management, experimental science, systems engineering, and 
industrial ecology.51 The defining moment for catalyzing it into a robust 
model for administrative decisionmaking, however, came with the 
publication of an influential book from the late 1970s, Adaptive 
 
 50. BYRON K. WILLIAMS & ELEANOR D. BROWN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR APPLICATIONS GUIDE 11 (2012). 
 51. Allen et al., supra note 36, at 1340 (noting these origins). 
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Environmental Assessment and Management.52 C.S. Holling, the book’s 
editor, and his fellow researchers found conventional methods for 
managing natural resources at odds with the emerging model of 
ecosystems as dynamic systems. They focused on the basic properties of 
ecological systems to provide the premises of a new assessment and 
management method.53 Under a dynamic model of ecosystems, they 
concluded, management policy must put a premium on collecting 
information, establishing measurements of success, monitoring 
outcomes, using new information to adjust existing approaches, and 
being willing to change.54 The traditional management approach of 
natural resources policy was “to attack environmental stressors in 
piecemeal fashion, one at a time,” and to parcel decisionmaking “out 
among a variety of mission-specific agencies and resource-specific 
management regimes.”55 The adaptive management framework that 
Holling et al. and other early theorists outlined was more evolutionary 
and interdisciplinary, relying on iterative cycles of goal determination, 
model building, performance-standard setting, outcome monitoring, 
and standard recalibration.56 
Since then, adaptive management theory has evolved into two 
dominant branches. The Decision-Theoretic School stresses working 
with relevant policy stakeholders to define the management problem, 
but from there relies principally on agency experts to develop process 
models used to guide adaptive decisionmaking.57 By contrast, the 
Resilience-Experimentalist School emphasizes maintaining a shared 
understanding among the relevant policy stakeholders throughout a 
continuous process of learning, hypothesis testing, and experimentation 
within the management-problem context.58 Both schools, however, 
stress the formalization of a structured decisionmaking process,59 the 
 
 52. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 1; see 
also Allen et al., supra note 36, at 1340 (recognizing the book as influential and describing Holling, 
the editor, as “widely recognized as the ‘father’ of adaptive management”); Kai N. Lee & Jody 
Lawrence, Restoration Under the Northwest Power Act: Adaptive Management: Learning from the 
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the 
term “adaptive management” to the book).  
 53. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 3, at 25–37. 
 54. See id. at 1–16. 
 55. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in 
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (2008). 
 56. See Allen et al., supra note 36, at 1340 (describing the work of another influential early 
theorist of adaptive management, Carl Walters). 
 57. See McFadden et al., supra note 23, at 1355 (discussing the attributes of the agency-
expertise model). 
 58. See id. (discussing the attributes of the active-experimentation model). 
 59. See id. at 1354–56 (stressing the importance of testing decisionmaking approaches). 
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difference between the two being how actively the decisionmakers probe 
for information and experiment with different policy options within the 
management-problem context versus relying on modeling and 
observation.60 The formal, structured decision process in both cases 
involves a “setup” phase, during which an agency specifies stakeholder 
involvement, management objectives, management actions, models, 
and monitoring plans, followed by an “iterative” phase, during which 
the agency specifies the decisionmaking process, follow-up monitoring, 
assessment, and feedback.61 It is this structured decisionmaking 
process that moves adaptive management beyond mere trial and error 
and contingency planning.62 
B. Successful Adaptive Management in Practice 
Common to both schools of adaptive management theory are 
core assumptions about necessary conditions for its successful 
implementation.63 These conditions break down into two broad 
categories, one having to do with the attributes of the management-
problem context and the other with the practical, political, and 
normative constraints operating in the decisionmaking environment. 
 
 60. Thus the two approaches have been differentiated along the “active” versus “passive” 
spectrum, with the active end using “a multistep process involving integrative ecological modeling, 
conscious generation of testable scientific hypotheses, and field experimentation through carefully 
tailored management interventions designed to test specific hypotheses.” Karkkainen, supra note 
45, at 70; see also R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for Applications 
to Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2412 (2006) (distinguishing 
between active and passive adaptive management); Byron K. Williams, Passive and Active 
Adaptive Management: Approaches and an Example, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1371, 1372–74 (2011) 
(distinguishing between passive and active adaptive management and providing examples). 
 61. See WILLIAMS & BROWN, supra note 50, at 12–16; Williams, supra note 21, at 1348–50.  
 62. See Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 72–74; Williams, supra note 21, at 1347. 
 63. See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 5–9; see also, e.g., SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3270 § 2 (Mar. 9, 2007), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/order3270: 
Consideration of [adaptive management] is warranted when: (a) there are 
consequential decisions to be made; (b) there is an opportunity to apply learning; (c) the 
objectives of management are clear; (d) the value of reducing uncertainty is high; (e) 
uncertainty can be expressed as a set of competing, testable models; and (f ) an 
experimental design and monitoring system can be put in place with a reasonable 
expectation of reducing uncertainty. 
Melinda Harm Benson has fruitfully used these conditions to examine use of adaptive 
management for energy development on federal public lands. See Melinda Harm Benson, Adaptive 
Management Approaches by Resource Management Agencies in the United States: Implications for 
Energy Development in the Interior West, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 92–104 (2010). 
Our synthesis of conditions for successful adaptive management captures each of these concepts 
and expands on them in several respects based on the work of other adaptive management 
theorists.  
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1. Management-Problem Context 
Adaptive management theorists, as well as agencies practicing 
adaptive management, agree that it is not well suited for all regulatory 
problems. Craig Allen and Lance Gunderson, in their synthesis of the 
literature on this theme, identify three key characteristics of 
management problems that define how effective adaptive management 
can be in application—uncertainty, controllability, and risk64—to which 
some theorists add a fourth characteristic, dynamic system.65 
Uncertainty involves the decisionmaker’s level of understanding and 
information regarding the attributes and behavior of the regulatory 
context in response to its environment as well as to management 
interventions.66 As uncertainty rises, confidence in the front-end 
decisionmaking method erodes, given its “all in” bet on the agency’s big 
decision. Controllability turns on the degree to which the decisionmaker 
can manipulate the regulatory environment.67 Higher controllability 
means that decisionmakers have greater capacity to intervene in the 
management-problem context and thus can engage in more 
experimentation and option testing. Risk describes the chance that 
experimentation and other interventions in the management-problem 
context can lead to irreversible adverse consequences.68 Dynamic 
system, finally, hinges on how static the management-problem context 
is over time, both inherently and in response to management 
interventions.69 If a regulatory problem is dynamic rather than static, 
the fundamental question is whether we know enough about the 
dynamic processes (uncertainty) to manipulate them (controllability) 
without messing things up (risk). 
The sweet spot for using adaptive management is when a 
management-problem context presents a dynamic system for which 
uncertainty and controllability are high and risk is low.70 For example, 
 
 64. See, e.g., Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380, 1383.  
 65. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 21, at 1352. 
 66. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380 (describing uncertainty in natural 
resources management contexts); Williams, supra note 21, at 1347–48 (discussing various sources 
of uncertainty). 
 67. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1379–80 (describing controllability in natural 
resource management contexts). 
 68. See id. at 1382–83 (describing risk in natural resource management contexts). 
 69. See Williams, supra note 21, at 1346 (emphasizing the dynamic nature of contexts 
appropriate for adaptive management). 
 70. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380, 1383 (comparing different scenarios of 
uncertainty, controllability, and risk); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information 
Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1467–70 (discussing the issue of uncertainty), 1477–78 (examining 
controllability issues) (2011); Williams, supra note 21, at 1346 (noting that “the management 
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consider an agency that has been managing a river system with 
numerous water impoundments over time and is now determining how 
better to manage the system for ecological values. The river and its 
associated ecological resources comprise a complex dynamic system 
subject to change over a spectrum of variables. There may be 
considerable uncertainty regarding the effects of new management 
strategies, such as releasing substantially more water from 
impoundments for extended periods. But there is also considerable 
control over that decision: the impoundments can be opened or closed 
at will—and relatively quickly at that. With sufficient monitoring, 
therefore, risk can likely be kept low by adjusting water releases in 
response to detected problems before they become more serious. 
The main thrust of adaptive management is to reduce 
uncertainty through integrative learning fostered in a structured, 
iterative decisionmaking process. This approach is most relevant for 
dynamic regulatory contexts like this river-management scenario in 
which uncertainty and controllability are high and risk is low.71 By 
contrast, if uncertainty is low, investment in learning is unnecessary; if 
controllability is low, investment in learning is pointless; and if risk is 
high, investment in intervention could backfire, leading to severe and 
irreversible consequences.72 Therefore, when uncertainty and 
controllability are low and risk is high, investing in adaptive 
management would be wasteful or even dangerous. In such situations, 
the best course would be to build as much resilience as possible into the 
affected social, economic, or ecological resources and respond reactively 
to adverse conditions with trial and error.73 
Recognizing the factors that make adaptive management helpful 
can, in some regulatory contexts, also suggest that different 
decisionmaking processes are useful for different aspects of the 
regulatory problem. Consider, for example, the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (“FDA”) approval of new drugs for human use under 
 
situation for adaptive management can be framed in terms of resources that are responsive to 
management interventions but subject to uncertainties about the impacts of those interventions”). 
 71. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380, 1383 (emphasizing these purposes of 
adaptive management).  
 72. See id. at 1380–83 (comparing scenarios); Doremus, supra note 70, at 1467 (adaptive 
management “is only useful if learning is needed”). 
 73. Allen and Gunderson build two matrices, one using uncertainty and controllability as the 
axes and the other using uncertainty and risk, to allocate different decisionmaking methods to 
different combinations of these three management-problem context attributes. Allen & 
Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1380, 1383. In addition to adaptive management, the alternative 
methods they consider are scenario planning, maximum sustained yield, build resilience, best 
management practice, and nurture and triage. Id.  
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the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.74 The whole point of front-
end FDA screening is to ensure, to the extent possible from relatively 
short-term testing, that any new drug is both safe and effective75 (i.e., 
to minimize uncertainty and to minimize the risk before the drug enters 
the stream of commerce). Such new drug approvals are thus classic 
“light switch” decisions not amenable to adaptive management. 
Nevertheless, as approved drugs remain on the market, new risks and 
uncertainties regarding their safety can emerge—the classic problem of 
drug-induced toxic torts, as demonstrated by Vioxx and thalidomide. As 
uncertainty about long-term risks increases but short-term risks 
remain low, the FDA’s control over a drug’s continued use remains 
considerable, suggesting that the FDA could benefit from some sort of 
adaptive management process to identify, evaluate, and respond to the 
inevitable longer-term risks. In other words, where uncertainty and 
controllability are high and risk is low, adaptive management has 
potential advantages as a decisionmaking method, provided the 
decisionmaking environment is well suited to its needs. 
2. Decisionmaking Environment 
In addition to describing the ideal conditions of the 
management-problem context, adaptive management theorists also 
have outlined a set of practical, political, and normative constraints in 
the decisionmaking environment that could impede application of 
adaptive management.76 To be sure, alternative decisionmaking 
methods have their own sets of such constraints, and it is outside the 
scope of this Article to provide a comparative analysis of the constraints 
of different methods. Our purpose here is to identify the constraints in 
the decisionmaking environment that point against using adaptive 
management in its otherwise appropriate regulatory contexts, unless 
other viable methods suffer from even more limiting constraints. 
First, even in appropriate management-problem contexts, the 
iterative decisionmaking style of adaptive management must be a good 
fit for the practical realities of the working environment.77 In 
 
 74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99d (2012). 
 75. See id. § 355(d) (describing the grounds on which the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services may deny an application for a new drug). 
 76. For a comprehensive itemization of such constraints in their legal context, see Biber, 
supra note 47 (manuscript at 6–19) (discussing problems associated with scale, time, cost, politics, 
information production, institutional continuity, uncertainty, and learning).  
 77. See WILLIAMS & BROWN, supra note 50, at 12 (noting that there must be “a flexible 
management environment that allows for changes in management as understanding accumulates 
over time”). 
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transportation planning, for example, there is uncertainty regarding 
the effects of new infrastructure options to address congestion in an 
urban transit network responding to dynamic demographic and 
economic trends.78 Controllability is high—a new highway or light-rail 
system can be inserted into the network—and risk of irreversibly 
massive failure might be assessed as low. Even so, experimenting with 
highways, light-rail systems, and other large-scale, expensive, and 
rather permanent infrastructure projects is simply not practical. 
Transit solutions can be provided incrementally over time, as in phases 
of a highway project or the addition of a light-rail system to an existing 
surface road system, but the costs and disruptions of switching them 
out, testing one mode here and another across town, and deciding 
midstream with one mode to significantly alter its design all 
substantially constrain use of adaptive management’s iterative 
decisionmaking process.79 Front-end decisionmaking thus dominates 
transportation planning,80 with adaptive management theory applied 
more to flow-control mechanisms, such as traffic-flow detectors, 
improved signage, variable tolls, and traffic light timing.81 
Where iterative decisionmaking is practical given the context, it 
must have a purpose. An agency charged with adaptive management 
must also be charged with fulfilling or establishing clear management 
goals using measurable performance metrics.82 Adaptive management 
isn’t just for the kicks of making lots of decisions. In the river-
management scenario used above, for example, management goals 
 
 78. See Joseph Y.J. Chow et al., A Network Option Portfolio Management Framework for 
Adaptive Transportation Planning, 45 TRANSP. RES. PART A 765, 765–66 (2011) (discussing the 
difficulties involved with adaptive transportation planning). 
 79. See WILLIAMS & BROWN, supra note 50, at 12 (noting that “an adaptive approach is not 
warranted if potential improvements in management are insufficient to justify the costs of 
obtaining the information needed”). 
 80. See Chow et al., supra note 78, at 765 (arguing that “[c]onventional practice in 
transportation planning relies on a passive approach to project investment” in which “[e]ach 
project is typically evaluated in a single long range future forecast year . . . without any adaptation 
to changing conditions over time”). 
 81. See, e.g., Adaptive Traffic Control Systems, PA. DEP’T TRANSP. 
http://www.dot.state.pa.us/Portal%20Information/Traffic%20Signal%20Portal/adaptivesystems.h
tml (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (providing examples). 
 82. See Biber, supra note 47 (manuscript at 16–17) (discussing reasons why “clear goals are 
important for an adaptive management program”); Clinton T. Moore et al., Adaptive Management 
in the U.S. National Wildlife Refuge System: Science-Management Partnerships for Conservation 
Delivery, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1395, 1396 (2011) (noting that adaptive management requires “[a] 
clear statement of measurable objectives”); Susskind et al., supra note 19, at 50 (concluding from 
a case study that adaptive management requires “clear goals and concrete objectives against which 
progress can be measured”); Williams, supra note 21, at 1348–49 (stressing the importance of 
clearly defined management goals). 
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might specify achieving any or a combination of the following: restoring 
natural conditions, eliminating nonnative species, improving 
recreational opportunities, protecting endangered species, ensuring 
continued water supply, and so on. The point is that the agency needs 
firm outcome targets in order both to design management options, 
monitoring programs, and assessment methods, and to evaluate 
alternative management plans. 
With goals in hand, the agency must also operate in an 
environment that allows implementing the core features of adaptive 
management. There must be technologically feasible methods available 
for reliably monitoring the relevant system variables.83 Some variables, 
such as rainfall, are easy to monitor; others, such as species population 
size, may not be.84 There must also be a set of management options that 
are technologically and legally available for the agency to test and 
compare so as to better inform recurring decisions.85 In the river-
management scenario, removal of impoundments might be an approach 
worth considering as a way to improve learning, but the agency might 
not have the authority to entertain that option, or, as noted above, 
testing hypotheses about impoundment removal could be very 
technologically and economically challenging.86 Finally, the time frame 
for monitoring, testing hypotheses, and adjusting management options 
must match the time frame of the system’s dynamic-change 
properties.87 Mismatches can create lags between adaptive 
management implementation and policy-relevant time frames. If the 
consequences of a management action cannot be detected for, say, a 
century, the institutional opportunity to take advantage of adaptive 
management in realistic policy time horizons is limited. When all of 
these practical conditions are met, though, the agency is able to work 
toward the core objective of the adaptive management approach—
reducing uncertainty about the consequences of adopting available 
management options while implementing selected options.88 
Practical suitability for adaptive management, however, does 
not guarantee political suitability. Adaptive management is a resource-
 
 83. See Doremus, supra note 70, at 1473 (stressing the importance of monitoring). 
 84. See id. (giving this example). 
 85. See Moore et al., supra note 82, at 1396 (noting that adaptive management operates 
through recurrent decisions selecting from “clearly defined decision alternatives”). 
 86. See Doremus, supra note 70, at 1484 (giving this example). 
 87. See id. at 1472–73 (stressing the importance of matched time frames). 
 88. See Moore et al., supra note 82, at 1396 (noting that adaptive management “integrates 
the decision making and learning processes, so that decision making can proceed even as 
uncertainty is being resolved”). 
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intensive decisionmaking method that relies on continuous agency 
monitoring, experimentation, and assessment.89 To be sure, the 
conventional method of front-end decisionmaking burdens agency 
resources as well, but most of the decisionmaking costs are front loaded. 
Adaptive management, on the other hand, requires the consistent 
financial support of legislative funding and agency allocation of funds 
over extended time frames. This means that legislative and agency-
level leaders—in other words, policymakers—must conclude that 
reducing uncertainty about the regulatory problem is sufficiently 
feasible and valuable to justify the costs.90 Moreover, political support 
for adaptive management must persist beyond the initial authorization 
to practice it—the legislature cannot micromanage or punish agencies’ 
adaptive decisions and expect agencies to break out of the a/m lite 
mold.91 Of course, the agency itself also must support a culture of 
adaptive management.92 Adaptive management tolerates the 
possibility that even with a robustly designed and faithfully 
implemented adaptive management protocol, some experiments will 
fail, and some decisions will be proven wrong. If “heads roll” when that 
happens, agency personnel at the implementation level have little 
incentive to move beyond a/m lite. Finally, most adaptive management 
theorists include stakeholder engagement as a critical condition for 
political viability of adaptive management.93 Stakeholder engagement 
allows the agency to learn from the affected community when shaping 
goals and protocols and to communicate agency decisionmaking 
 
 89. See id. at 1396 (noting that adaptive management requires “[a] system of 
monitoring . . . in place to inform the decision maker”).  
 90. See Biber, supra note 47 (manuscript at 8–10) (discussing problems associated with 
funding and the assessment of whether the costs of adaptive management justify the gains in 
reducing uncertainty); Camacho, supra note 37, at 72–74 (emphasizing the need for funding to 
sustain adaptive management monitoring). 
 91. See Doremus, supra note 70, at 1477–78 (“[I]nitial management steps must not become 
immediately locked in, either formally by law or informally by reason of their practical effect.”). 
 92. Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1382–83 (discussing a number of agency-culture 
barriers); Susan K. Jacobson et al., Understanding Barriers to Implementation of an Adaptive 
Land Management Program, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1516, 1518 (2006) (discussing a number 
of agency culture barriers); Moore et al., supra note 82, at 1397 (observing that “traditions of the 
[agency] can make implementation of adaptive management difficult in some settings”); Williams, 
supra note 21, at 1348 (discussing a number of agency-culture barriers). 
 93. See Allen & Gunderson, supra note 36, at 1381 (discussing techniques of stakeholder 
involvement); Williams, supra note 21, at 1348 (discussing techniques of stakeholder involvement). 
Even adaptive management’s enhanced use of stakeholder engagement confronts potential 
obstacles in administrative law, however, as the demanding and time-consuming process 
requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act could be triggered. See Melinda Harm 
Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas Developments: Existing Obstacles and 
Opportunities for Reform, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,962, 10,969–71 (2009) (discussing the potential for 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act to impede adaptive management).   
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assumptions and rationales. To be sure, stakeholder engagement does 
not necessarily equate with stakeholder support, but lack of 
engagement is likely to reduce the chances of such support forming. 
Even when the management-problem context and 
decisionmaking environment both point in the direction of using 
adaptive management, some contexts involve highly normative 
boundaries that would not allow the degree of experimentation and 
decision adjustment needed to put adaptive management to work. For 
example, the “dial twiddling” approach likely would offend sensibilities 
in contexts such as civil rights and child labor controls. It is outside the 
scope of this Article to fully inventory what policy realms involve such 
normative constraints—that is largely a social and political decision. 
We recognize, however, that these policy realms exist and that, 
regardless of whether using adaptive management would be practicable 
in the absence of the normative constraints, it may well be taken off the 
table as a viable method for decisionmaking. 
This is not to say that adaptive management is necessarily 
inappropriate whenever strong normative principles motivate 
regulatory policy. Indeed, as suggested above in the ESA context, 
adaptive management can be embedded within front-end regulatory 
structures to facilitate overall policy goals. Under the ESA, the 
designation of a species as endangered is a binary decision that the 
agency must base solely on the best available science.94 No adaptive 
management is allowed there. Such designation automatically triggers 
regulatory protection of the species,95 but a permitting program allows 
actions that harm the species to proceed under regulated conditions.96 
During the 1990s, the ESA-administering agencies reformed that 
permitting process substantially, including integrating an adaptive 
management component within the permit program to manage actions 
that could “pose a significant risk to the species due to significant data 
or information gaps.”97 In essence, the permit program now involves a 
traditional front-end decision—whether to issue the permit, and, if so, 
what should be its initial design—with an iterative decisionmaking 
 
 94. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2012) (defining the designation criteria). 
 95. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A)–(B) (prohibiting takings of protected species). 
 96. Id. § 1539(a)(1). Permits under this provision are known as “incidental take permits,” but 
they require applicant submission of a “habitat conservation plan” and thus are also referred to as 
“HCP permits.” Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).  
 97. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK, at add. 
Executive Summary, at 1 (2000). See generally Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the 
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 35,242 (June 1, 2000) (providing notice of, and reasons for, the adaptive management 
revisions).  
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component added for long-term management of uncertainty. Although 
some commentators have accused this program of being more a/m lite 
than true adaptive management,98 it illustrates the potential for 
adaptive management to work within a strongly normative and coercive 
regulatory program rather than as a complete alternative to it. 
The ideal policy medium for adaptive management thus exhibits 
the following set of qualities: 
 
 The management-problem context changes dynamically over 
time in response to environmental conditions as well as 
management interventions. 
 Decisionmakers have incomplete knowledge of the 
management-problem context’s dynamic processes 
(uncertainty is high) but can manipulate various features of 
the problem context through interventions (controllability is 
high) without causing substantial irreversible damage (risk 
is low). 
 The management-problem context allows for iterative 
decisionmaking. 
 Decisionmakers have clear management objectives and the 
methodological capacity to use experimentation, option 
testing, monitoring, assessment, and learning to reduce 
uncertainty and adjust management decisions in policy-
relevant time frames. 
 Decisionmakers have both sufficient funding and staffing 
resources and the political and stakeholder support needed 
to implement the adaptive management decision 
methodology as designed and to adjust management 
decisions based on learning. 
 Implementing the adaptive management method will not 
offend inviolable norms associated with the management-
problem context. 
 
If a particular mangement-problem context does not meet these 
conditions, neither we nor most adaptive management theorists would 
 
 98. See George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Habitat Conservation Plans, 16 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 20 (2002) (contending that “few HCPs incorporate genuine adaptive 
management”). Going further, Doremus et al. condemn the use of adaptive management in the 
ESA permit program as “a justification for going ahead with actions that would not otherwise be 
allowed.” DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 6. Properly designed, however, that is what adaptive 
management should provide—i.e., that if uncertainty is high, controllability is high, and risk is 
low for matters within the scope of the permit, a permit integrating adaptive management to 
address the uncertainty should be more likely to be approved than one that does not.  
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advocate the use of adaptive management unless alternative 
decisionmaking methods seem even less likely to succeed. Thus, from 
the outset, we recognize and accept that adaptive management is not 
appropriate for all, or even most, administrative agency 
decisionmaking. Nevertheless, there is a subset of contexts where true 
adaptive management would offer clear advantages over conventional 
front-end decisionmaking. And there, it is worth examining how current 
administrative law presents obstacles to adaptive management and 
how to design new administrative law principles to facilitate use of 
adaptive management in those applications. We turn now to this task. 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: VALUES AND OBSTACLES TO ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT 
Administrative law seeks to protect a range of values, such as 
due process and public participation, through procedural requirements. 
The resulting body of law, however, poses significant barriers to agency 
use of adaptive management. As a result, if administrative law is to 
accommodate adaptive management, legislators must recognize these 
barriers and adjust administrative law accordingly.99  
Even within administrative law, however, some contexts need 
an adaptive management track far more than others. For example, if 
an agency orders third parties to engage in adaptive management as 
part of a permit or license, or if adaptive management is prescribed as 
part of a court settlement, then the agency should not need a general 
 
 99. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources 
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1413–17 (2011) (describing how front-end decisionmaking has 
proven a barrier to adaptive management); Ahjond S. Garmestani et al., Panarchy, Adaptive 
Management, and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1036, 1045 
(2009) (“The fundamental constraint to adaptive management is the current state of 
administrative law.”); Alfred R. Light, Tales of the Tamiami Trail: Implementing Adaptive 
Management in Everglades Restoration, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59, 96 (2006) (“The basic 
problem is that the conventional administrative law system is geared to ‘command and control,’ 
where activity is regulated using permits that target emissions or discharges for limitation. During 
the permit period, changes in the terms are not anticipated—i.e., no adaptation based on learning 
by doing is allowed.”); Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 73–76 (recognizing the problems of current 
administrative law and proposing an adaptive management track); John H. Davidson & Thomas 
Earl Geu, The Missouri River and Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecological Function and 
Legal Process, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 859 (2001) (noting that neither administrative rulemaking nor 
administrative adjudication procedures are designed for adaptive management projects). Notably, 
this problem is not limited to administrative law in the United States. For example, Canadian 
scholar Martin Olszynski has argued that Canadian law must provide more clearly for adaptive 
management (“AM”), “failing which traditional principles of administrative law may thwart 
attempts to implement AM.” Martin Z.P. Olszynski, Adaptive Management in Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Law: Exploring Uses and Limitations, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 1, 28 
(2010). 
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set of administrative procedures to engage in or supervise the specified 
adaptive management. Instead, the permit, license, or settlement will 
(or at least should) dictate implementation and oversight procedures, 
specify monitoring criteria and requirements, provide reopener clauses, 
or specify penalties for noncompliance.  As such, a special adaptive 
management track is most useful when an agency is seeking to use 
adaptive management for its own projects or information gathering, or 
for projects or information gathering done in collaboration with 
nonregulated entities. 
This Part reviews the key features of current administrative law 
that pose obstacles to agencies’ abilities to fully implement adaptive 
management even in otherwise appropriate applications. These 
features include requirements for public participation in agencies’ 
decisionmaking, the provision of judicial oversight over most agency 
decisions and processes, and requirements that drive agencies toward 
finality. The next Part will then examine how we can preserve these 
values—albeit in modified form—in an administrative law scheme that 
allows for real adaptive management. 
A. Public Participation 
One of the critical values enshrined in contemporary 
administrative law is public participation. For example, the APA 
requires federal agencies (1) in informal rulemaking to give both the 
general public “notice of proposed rulemaking[s]” and any “interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking”;100 (2) in 
adjudications to “give all interested parties opportunity for” various 
forms of participation;101 (3) in the context of any agency proceeding to 
give “prompt notice” to interested persons “of the denial in whole or part 
of a written application, petition, or other request”;102 and (4) in 
receiving a petition for agency action, which can be made by any 
interested person, to respond to that petition.103 
A host of scholars applaud public participation in administrative 
processes, and public participation is a core principle of American 
administrative law theory. As administrative law literature articulates, 
 
 100. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c). 
 101. Id. § 554(c). 
 102. Id. § 555(e). 
 103. Id. §§ 553(e), 555(b); see also Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
794 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that “an agency ‘is required to at least definitively 
respond to . . . [a] petition—that is, to either deny or grant the petition’ ” (quoting Families for 
Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).  
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public participation in agency decisionmaking is valuable for its own 
sake,104 but it also promotes administrative legitimacy and public 
acceptance,105 encourages the agency’s consideration of diverse and 
divergent points of view,106 promotes transparency in agency 
decisionmaking,107 checks unbridled agency discretion,108 and increases 
 
 104. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil 
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1244 (2012) (noting the 
importance of public participation in agency decisionmaking so decisionmakers consider a range 
of different perspectives); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: 
Building the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297, 316–17 
(discussing the use of the phrase “public participation” in administrative law and the specific 
processes for implementing public participation); William Funk, Public Participation and 
Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 
171, 171–72 (2009) (stating that public participation and transparency “are hallmarks of American 
administrative law” and examining several statutory schemes designed to increase public 
participation); Richard B. Stewart, Essay, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 444 (2003) (“Public participation through rulemaking and other 
processes . . . [has] become [a] central foundation[] of administrative law practice.”). 
 105. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 104, at 1244; Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining 
Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011); Nina A. 
Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343 
(2011); Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the 
Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 388 (2009); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 972 (2008); Stephen M. 
Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 702–03 (2007); Stephen M. Johnson, 
The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government 
Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 289 (1998) (“Public participation is 
essential to sound agency decisionmaking because . . . it instills a sense of legitimacy in the public 
for the agency’s decisions.”); Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and 
(Breach of) the Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying 
Environmental Protection?, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 12 & n.50 (1996); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing 
Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 445; Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the 
Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L.J. 1497, 1505 (1992); Dennis Thompson, Bureaucracy and 
Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE 235, 237–50 (Graeme Duncan ed., 1983); 
Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 
75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 529, 574 (1977); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative 
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 381 (1972). 
 106. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 104, at 1244; Funk, supra note 104, at 179–80; 
Stewart, supra note 104, at 1713–15; Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass 
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 187 (1997); KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 424 (3d ed. 1994); Peter D. 
Holmes, Paradise Postponed: Suspensions of Agency Rules, 65 N.C. L. REV. 645, 688 (1987); Barry 
Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of 
Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 843–44 (1985). 
 107. Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
831, 877 (2012) (“By forcing agencies to incorporate public participation into their decisionmaking 
processes, the APA renders agency decisions more transparent and better informed.”); Bingham, 
supra note 104, at 334–41; Funk, supra note 104, at 171–72. 
 108. Watts, supra note 105, at 36; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1715–18; Ann Bray, Comment, 
Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to Citizen Participation in Environmental Agency Decision 
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the amount of information available to decisionmakers, including 
information regarding the regulated entities’ and general public’s 
preferences.109 
Adaptive management threatens, or at least is perceived to 
threaten, the promotion of public participation in traditional 
administrative law. One possible response to this objection is that 
administrative law theory has increasingly criticized extensive public 
participation requirements because they create burdensome 
inefficiency in agency decisionmaking,110 a criticism resonant with the 
impediments that administrative law creates for true adaptive 
management. We do not, however, rest our promotion of adaptive 
management on the devaluation of public participation in agency 
decisionmaking; we admit, moreover, that there is a fundamental 
tension between continual public deliberative debate over an agency’s 
action and that agency’s commitment to principled adaptive 
management over time. But the inescapable trade-off is that “the black-
letter law . . . constrains how far agencies can go with a/m-lite, as truly 
iterative ‘learning while doing’ may at some point run afoul of . . . the 
demands of public notice and comment.”111 In natural resources law, for 
example, “environmental protection interests are concerned that 
[adaptive management] will lead to closed-door resource development 
approvals.”112 Moreover, public participation in some prominent 
environmental adoptions of adaptive management, such as for Habitat 
 
Making, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1991); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
266–68 (1978). 
 109. Tran, supra note 107, at 877; Mendelson, supra note 105, at 1344–46; Watts, supra note 
105, at 62; Mantel, supra note 105, at 388; Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 105, at 972; Rossi, 
supra note 106, at 186–87; Holmes, supra note 106, at 688. 
 110. Mantel, supra note 105, at 388–89. See generally David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using 
Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of 
Citizens’ Roles in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2008) 
(empirically assessing the role of public participation in administrative law); Rossi, supra note 106 
(exploring the idea that public participation can overwhelm agency processes); Edward Rubin, The 
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005) 
(exploring the limits of traditional models of administrative process, including public 
participation); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency 
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001) (same); Mark Seidenfeld, supra note 12, at 483–84 (same); Mark 
Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible 
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000) (same); Stewart, supra note 104 (same); Mark 
Seidenfeld, supra note 12, at 483–84 (same); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for 
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1541 (1992) (“[T]he problem today is not a lack of 
responsiveness to popular interests, but rather an overresponsiveness to immediate and fickle 
political whims and to powerful factions . . . .”). 
 111. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 480. 
 112. Id. at 478. 
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Conservation Plans under the ESA, has been limited and subject to 
demands for greater public input.113 
This tension, nevertheless, can be resolved by aligning public 
participation requirements and opportunities with the structured 
decisionmaking process that adaptive management demands, achieving 
a balance between public participation and agency effectiveness. As 
Jessica Mantel has pointed out in a different context, 
A vigorous administrative state that efficiently and effectively serves the public interest 
is jeopardized by excessive procedural requirements that consume significant agency 
resources and unnecessarily delay agency action. Accordingly, preserving the ability of 
government officials to meet society’s needs depends on reaching a delicate balance 
between administrative processes that advance the legitimacy of the regulatory state 
while preserving its effectiveness. The challenge, then, is to construct administrative 
processes . . . that strike this balance.114 
As we discussed in Part II, adaptive management theorists 
already encourage stakeholder participation in the setup phase of 
adaptive management, and this setup phase lends itself well to 
traditional modes of public participation in agency decisionmaking, 
especially informal rulemaking. Moreover, while direct public 
participation must be constrained in the iterative implementation 
phase of adaptive management if true adaptive agency decisionmaking 
is to be allowed, the law can easily accommodate transparency concerns 
by requiring agencies to regularly produce public reports on their 
implementation “dial twiddling” and to publicly publish monitoring 
results at regular intervals. Finally, the iterative structure of adaptive 
management—if coupled with a “reset button” requirement that 
agencies periodically return to the setup phase (as we propose 
below)115—provides parallel iterative opportunities for public 
participation. Moreover, this public participation would be enhanced in 
subsequent decisionmaking rounds by the availability of agency reports 
and the accumulation of monitoring data. In other words, adaptive 
management readily lends itself to direct public participation in the 
agency’s periodic “big decisions”—the defining and redefining of specific 
management goals and the periodic evaluation and reevaluation of 
management measures employed—even as it requires administrative 
law to carve out space for a certain amount of discretionary 
implementation in between. The design issue posed, of course, is how 
 
 113. Id. at 479–80. 
 114. Mantel, supra note 105, at 389. See also Peter A. Pfohl, Congressional Review of Agency 
Rulemaking: The 104th Congress and the Salvage Timber Directive, 14 J.L. & POL. 1, 25–26 (1998) 
(discussing how Congress achieved this same kind of balance in the distinction between notice-
and-comment rulemaking and rulemaking exempt from these procedural requirements). 
 115. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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far to spread apart those “big decisions” (or “reset buttons”), which we 
deal with below.116 
B. Judicial Review 
The availability of judicial review is one of the hallmarks of 
contemporary administrative law in the United States.117 Indeed, 
historically, judicial review was one of the procedural safeguards that 
allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to bless the administrative state as 
constitutional, despite the lack of mention of administrative agencies in 
the U.S. Constitution and despite their engagement in adjudications.118 
Judicial review advances several important values in 
administrative law. Most obviously, it ensures that agencies comply 
with congressional dictates and hence oversees exercises of agency 
discretion.119 Scholars also laud judicial review for its ability to prevent 
agencies from being “captured” by regulated entities contrary to the 
broader public interest120 and to promote reasoned and reasonable 
 
 116. See generally infra Part IV.B. 
 117. Stewart, supra note 104, at 444; Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative 
Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
313, 314, 320-21 (2013). 
 118. E.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 
450 (1977) (holding that Congress could create a new cause of action in the government for civil 
penalties under the Occupational Safety and Health Act enforceable in an administrative agency 
where there is no jury trial). 
 119. Carrie Leonetti, Watching the Hen House: Judicial Rulemaking and Judicial Review, 91 
NEB. L. REV. 72, 117 (2012); Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency 
Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1724 (2012); Jack M. 
Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011); 
Watts, supra note 105, at 38; Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative 
Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2008); Robert L. Glicksman, Securing Judicial Review of Agency 
Inaction (and Action) in the Wake of Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, in STRATEGIES 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 163, 169 (Michael Allen Wolf 
ed., 2005); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1687–89 (2004); Stewart, supra note 104, at 1669–70, 1673–76; STEPHEN 
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 
985 (5th ed. 2002); Steven P. Croley, State Administrative Law Reform: Recent Experience in 
Michigan, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 347, 396–97 (1999); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active 
Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 634 (1997); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 668 
(1985); Philip J. Harter, The Political Legitimacy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. 
U. L. REV. 471, 485–86 (1983); Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review 
of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1981). 
 120. Wagner, supra note 119, at 1717–24; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American 
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985). 
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agency decisionmaking.121 Finally, judicial review provides another 
route for promoting transparent agency decisionmaking and public 
participation in agency processes.122 
Nevertheless, judicial review as currently constituted imposes 
two primary barriers to effective adaptive management. First, 
regardless of the standard used, the very availability of judicial review 
for each final agency decision is too intrusive, threatening agencies’ 
authority and practical ability to adjust adaptive management projects 
and management measures as they learn without being immediately 
hauled into court for every little dial adjustment. Admittedly, review 
pursuant to the APA and most other statutes is limited to “final agency 
action,”123 suggesting that some minor agency “dial twiddling” might be 
exempt from judicial review even under current law, especially if courts 
were to classify adaptive management decisions as being “committed to 
agency discretion.” However, as the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
confirmed, actions that a federal agency considers tentative, 
preliminary, or experimental may nonetheless be considered “final,” 
especially if the decision concludes an agency determination of some 
sort or creates legal consequences.124 Moreover, the very fact that there 
is litigation challenging iterative-phase decisions still disrupts the 
structured adaptive management decisionmaking process—even if the 
agency eventually prevails. 
Second, current standards for judicial review do not match the 
process of adaptive management. For example, agencies must 
demonstrate that their decisions are reasonable (not arbitrary and 
capricious) attempts to fulfill statutory mandates and goals. However, 
a recent comprehensive study of how courts have treated agency 
attempts to employ adaptive management in natural resources law 
concluded that “adaptive management procedures, no matter how finely 
crafted, cannot substitute for showing that a plan will meet the 
substantive management criteria required by law.”125 On the other 
 
 121. Hammond & Markell, supra note 117, at 121; Wagner, supra note 119, at 1723–24.; 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “History Belongs to the Winners”: The Bazelon-Levanthal Debate and 
the Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1009 (2006); Croley, supra note 119, at 396–97; Susannah T. French, 
Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 944 
(1993); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 601 (1965). 
 122. Matthew Groves, Should We Follow the Gospel of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (CTH)?, 34 MELB. U. L. REV. 736, 760 (2010). 
 123. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
 124. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371–72, 1374 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 125. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 445. 
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hand, the study also revealed a judicial receptiveness to adaptive 
management in theory, concluding that 
regardless of the particular outcome of judicial review, courts generally wish to support 
the trend toward adaptive management . . . . Courts sometimes explicitly state that they 
do not wish to create disincentives for using adaptive management . . . . It is fair to 
conclude from this litigation that courts, despite their roots in the conventional 
administrative law model of a phase change at the time of final agency action, generally 
give agencies wide berth within statutory constraints to alter traditional planning 
approaches to accommodate adaptive management.126 
Thus, when administrative law itself can accommodate adaptive 
management, the courts will also try to support its use. 
Nevertheless, the fact that courts generally support adaptive 
management in natural resources law does not prevent them from 
overturning agency attempts to employ adaptive management, 
particularly when the courts are not convinced that the agency’s 
adaptive management plan will achieve substantive statutory 
requirements.127 Moreover, under current principles of administrative 
law, it is difficult for courts to “directly distinguish legitimate adaptive 
management from imposters.”128 One reason is that no legislation 
requires an agency to adhere to legitimate adaptive management 
methodology, leaving courts with inappropriate procedural 
requirements against which to judge an agency’s invocation of adaptive 
management.129 For example, as much as adaptive management theory 
advocates that agencies “design[ ] management actions as experiments 
so that they promote learning to reduce uncertainty,” the reality is that 
“this crucial element of adaptive management is not generally required 
by law and courts will not impose it.”130 
C. Finality 
One of the entrenched values of contemporary administrative 
law is finality—the insistence on final resolutions by administrative 
agencies that will be definitively upheld or rejected by the courts. Thus, 
for example, while “agency action” subject to the APA includes a broad 
 
 126. Id. at 446–47. 
 127. Id. at 461–70. 
 128. Id. at 470. 
 129. As Ruhl and Fischman observe, “a court upholding an a/m-lite approach does not 
necessarily endorse the practice as advancing the goals of either law or conservation policy. It 
simply means that the use of a/m-lite did not run afoul of any specific legal requirement or 
substitute for a required finding or procedure.” Id. at 446. Moreover, “courts may approve agency 
actions that involve terrible applications of adaptive management.” Id. 
 130. Id. at 471. 
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range of agency activities—“the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, 
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to 
act”131— reviewable agency actions are limited to those “made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court.”132 More generally, nonfinal agency action 
is of no legal effect, a fact that the U.S. Supreme Court recently 
underscored in its evaluation of administrative compliance orders.133 
Investments in up-front decisionmaking, and hence an agency’s 
drive toward finality, are only increased when its actions are subject to 
additional requirements for regulatory impact analyses beyond the 
basic explanations that the APA’s (or state equivalent’s) “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard would require. Regulatory impact analyses can be 
legion, especially for federal agencies, but two of the most intensive are 
environmental-impact analyses134 and cost-benefit/risk-benefit/risk-
risk analyses.135 
Of course, valuing finality in administrative law reflects the 
American legal system’s more pervasive valuation of finality 
undergirding a variety of legal doctrines. As Dan Tarlock has 
summarized, 
We follow Hume and Bentham and seek to confirm settled expectations unless there is a 
compelling overriding reason, usually one grounded in constitutionally protected norms 
such as free expression or racial equality. Once a decision is rendered, we expect parties 
to forever abide by the outcome. Finality takes many forms. Sometimes, it is represented 
by express doctrines and legislation, such as res judicata, statutes of limitation, and the 
doctrine of vested rights. On other occasions, finality is implicit. For example, the premise 
behind an environmental impact statement is that once environmental damage has been 
 
 131. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012). 
 132. Id. § 704 (emphasis added). 
 133. See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371–74 (2012) (holding that EPA administrative 
compliance orders issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act are final agency actions subject to 
judicial review largely because those orders do have immediate legal effects). 
 134. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (requiring federal 
agencies to produce environmental-impact statements “in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment”); California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 
§§ 21000, 21002 (2012) (explaining California’s environmental-impact report requirements); New 
York State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8 (2012) 
(explaining New York’s environmental-impact statement requirements). For a discussion of how 
these statutes can each inhibit adaptive management and promote adaptive management, see 
Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 472–75. 
 135. E.g., Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 
3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (reaffirming the requirement of cost-benefit analyses for regulatory actions); 
Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) 
(requiring that agencies perform a cost-benefit analysis in determining whether and how to 
regulate). 
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fully disclosed, a one-time decision can be made on the merits of the activity, and even if 
the activity will irrevocably alter the environment, the decision is legitimate and final.136 
The point here is not that finality is bad per se, but rather that 
the many procedural drivers toward finality in administrative law—the 
extensive requirements for front-end justification to produce a judicially 
defensible final agency action—effectively end further deliberation and 
debate over the agency’s decision, both publicly and within the 
agency.137 As such, they act as barriers to full agency implementation 
of true adaptive management. 
Indeed, because administrative law drives agencies toward 
finality, that body of law has little place for continual agency 
experimentation and adaptation, as adaptive management requires.138 
Instead, it both assumes and reifies a world where agency decisions are, 
most essentially, onetime and isolated events, not a continually 
evolving series of refinements—or, as adaptive management scholars 
have put it, “toggle” choices rather than “dial” adjustments.139 
This characterization is perhaps most obvious for agency 
adjudications—permitting, licensing, certification, and other decisions 
that apply laws to the actions of one or a discrete collection of 
individuals or entities. Rules, in contrast, are by definition amenable to 
amendment and replacement over time,140 allowing for some agency 
learning and adjustment. Nevertheless, under contemporary 
administrative law, each rulemaking effort—even the amendment or 
 
 136. A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of 
Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1140 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 137. As Ruhl and Fischman have explained: 
[F]inal agency action [is the step] when the government throws the switch and makes 
the decision it will implement and defend if challenged in court. The legal system 
regards the point of final agency action as a phase change when the fluid period of 
deliberation ends and implementation/defense of a fixed record and plan of action 
begins. 
Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 436–37 (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 419–20 (1971)). 
 138. As Susskind and Secunda have noted: 
Adaptive management theory treats almost all governmental interactions as 
experiments, from which we can continuously learn what works and what does not. 
Adaptive management envisions a continuous process of institutional transformation, 
as entities “evolve” their philosophies and strategies through continuous assessment 
and improvement. Change is driven by a constant flow of information gathered via 
purposeful experimentation. 
Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 157. 
 139. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 438 (“The legal view of a resource management 
plan is that it comprehensively evaluates all rational considerations at once and then flips a toggle 
switch; the adaptive management approach twiddles the dial as information trickles in.”). 
 140. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (defining “rule making” to include not only the initial 
promulgation of a rule but also the processes of amending and repealing rules). 
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modification of a prior rule—is evaluated as a separate legal event, not 
an ongoing process of agency learning and adaptation. Indeed, the 
courts have debated the degree of deference to which a federal agency 
is entitled when it amends a regulation,141 one indication that 
amendments are separate legal events rather than part of an ongoing 
agency decisionmaking process. In essence, the agency is supposed to 
“get it right” at each pronouncement and to “keep it right” until new 
information or changed circumstances justifies a change. There is very 
little room, even under the arbitrary and capricious standard, for an 
agency to say honestly, “We have only a vague idea now of how to 
achieve what we want to achieve, but we think this decision is a good 
start for now.”142 
In contrast, adaptive management allows—even demands—
continual managerial flexibility in the face of system complexity.143 In 
the realm of ecology and natural resources management, for example, 
adaptive management “was originally the domain of scientists 
frustrated with policy makers’ failure to grasp the complexity of the 
natural world.”144 Ecosystems, of course, are one of the paradigmatic 
complex systems—in the words of C.S. Holling, “complex, nonlinear 
systems where discontinuous behavior and structural change are the 
norm.”145 
Nevertheless, while ecologists rejected an equilibrium paradigm 
for ecosystems decades ago, environmental law has not caught up.146 As 
Dan Tarlock, among other scholars, has recognized, “The major 
institutional change necessitated by the nonequilibrium paradigm is 
the need to apply adaptive management to biodiversity protection.”147 
However, as he also has recognized, “The idea that all management is 
 
 141. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186–87 (1991) (explaining that an agency “must be 
given ample latitude ‘to adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’ ” 
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983))). 
 142. See Tarlock, supra note 136, at 1141–44 (describing the difficulties agencies encountered 
when trying to implement adaptive management). 
 143. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 424. 
 144. Wiersema, supra note 47, at 1245. 
 145. C.S. Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL 
OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 3, 19 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995); see also Ruhl & 
Fischman, supra note 6, at 428–31 (describing the evolution of views in natural resources policy). 
 146. See Tarlock, supra note 136, at 1122–23, 1125–30 (discussing the flaws of the equilibrium 
approach and the failure of policy makers to notice the scientific shift away from it); see also Ruhl 
& Fischman, supra note 6, at 424–27 (arguing that, while adaptive management “has become 
infused into the natural resources policy world to the point of ubiquity, surfacing in everything 
from mundane agency permits to grand presidential proclamations,” agencies are actually 
practicing “a/m lite” and courts do not support robust adaptive management). 
 147. Tarlock, supra note 136, at 1139. 
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an ongoing experiment poses a profound challenge to our legal system 
because it undermines a core principle of procedural and substantive 
fairness: finality.”148 The demand in administrative law for immediate 
finality again thus acts as a barrier to agency implementation of true 
adaptive management. 
D. A New Approach to Administrative Law 
Annacoos Wiersema has summarized the new governance 
literature from a variety of disciplines: 
[W]e live in a complex society where laws designed for particular purposes can have 
unanticipated consequences, where bureaucracy is too slow and cumbersome to respond 
quickly and efficiently enough to those consequences, and where the traditional structure 
of top-down lawmaking is under siege as too rigid, too hierarchical, and too contentious 
to achieve its goals. The world we live in, as legal writers spanning a range of fields tell 
us, requires new forms of governance.149 
Administrative law in particular has already evolved several times to 
accommodate changing values and to fix perceived problems. 
Nevertheless, administrative law has not yet evolved to embrace 
instances when agencies truly need additional kinds of flexibility. 
Notably, however, when Congress and the courts fully appreciate the 
need for ongoing federal agency flexibility and nimbleness in the face of 
changing circumstances, they exempt the agency from APA 
requirements. One prominent example is the Federal Reserve 
Board’s150 open market decisions, which include its determinations of 
interest rates and discount rates. Specifically, the Federal Reserve 
System’s Federal Open Market Committee (“FOMC”) “sets the federal 
funds rate at a level it believes will foster financial and monetary 
conditions consistent with achieving its monetary policy objectives, and 
it adjusts that target in line with evolving economic developments.”151 
Thus, although its decisionmaking process is rarely labeled as such, the 
FOMC engages in a form of continual adaptive management with the 
goal of maintaining economic stability in the face of complex and 
 
 148. Id. at 1140. 
 149. Wiersema, supra note 47, at 1241 (footnotes omitted). 
 150. Congress created the Federal Reserve System in 1913 through the Federal Reserve Act. 
Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). The “Federal Reserve Board,” for purposes of this discussion, is more properly named the 
Federal Open Market Committee, which “oversees open market operations” and “influence[s] 
overall monetary and credit conditions.” BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 3 (9th ed. 2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf. 
 151. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 150, at 16. 
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changing economic realities. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court 
classified the FOMC’s open market (domestic policy) decisions as 
interagency memoranda that are generally exempt from APA 
procedural requirements,152 while Congress provided special 
procedures for those decisions.153 Finally, the federal courts have 
refused judicial oversight of these FOMC decisions.154 As Judge 
Augustus Hand, writing for himself, Judge Learned Hand, and Judge 
Swan, once explained: 
It would be an unthinkable burden on any banking system if its open market sales and 
discount rates were to be subject to judicial review. Indeed, the correction of discount rates 
by judicial decree seems almost grotesque, when we remember that conditions in the 
money market often change from hour to hour, and the disease would ordinarily be long 
over before a judicial diagnosis could be made.155 
Thus, U.S. administrative law is no stranger to differentiated 
procedural requirements—including dramatically increased agency 
discretion—that reflect the reality that regulatory contexts vary. More 
specifically, Congress, through the administrative laws it has passed, 
already acknowledges that some such contexts require rapid 
adjustments to changing circumstances in order to achieve higher-level 
legislative and regulatory goals. Adaptive management could be one of 
the most valuable of the new governance tools to deal with the 
complexity and uncertainty of the contemporary world—a world that is 
subject to, among other things, continual and emerging stresses from 
phenomena such as climate change and rippling global economic 
crashes.156 Nevertheless, as Brad Karkkainen suggested as early as 
 
 152. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1979). 
 153. 12 U.S.C. §§ 247a, 263(b)–(c) (2012). The U.S. Supreme Court summarized the FOMC’s 
procedures as follows: 
The FOMC meets approximately once a month to review the overall state of the 
economy and consider the appropriate course of monetary and open market policy. The 
Committee's principal conclusions are embodied in a statement called the Domestic 
Policy Directive. The Directive summarizes the economic and monetary background of 
the FOMC’s deliberations and indicates in general terms whether the Committee 
wishes to follow an expansionary, deflationary, or unchanged monetary policy in the 
period ahead. The Committee also attempts to agree on specific tolerance ranges for the 
growth in the money supply and for the federal funds rate. 
Merrill, 443 U.S. at 344–45. 
 154. E.g., Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538, 
543–44 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit challenging the FOMC’s decisions on 
standing and separation of powers grounds). 
 155. Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 156. In the natural-resources-management context, for example, Professor Barbara Cosens 
has published pioneering work on the need for adaptive management as a tool for increasing 
resilience and coping with both system complexity and climate change. See, e.g., Barbara Cosens, 
Resilience and Law as a Theoretical Backdrop for Natural Resource Management: Flood 
Management in the Columbia River Basin, 42 ENVTL. L. 241, 252 (2012) (footnote omitted) 
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2005,157 adaptive management requires a different form of 
administrative law. The next Part thus proposes a different vision of 
the law governing agencies and describes the contexts in which 
adaptive management would be valuable. 
IV. ADDING AN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT TRACK TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 
To the extent that agencies have been attempting to implement 
adaptive management, they generally do so at the limits of their 
administrative discretion.158 While an agency’s desire to push the limits 
of its discretion to achieve a better regulatory or management program 
might be understandable, such stretching renders federal agencies 
vulnerable to “abuse of discretion” litigation,159 and in some states it is 
flatly illegal.160 Indeed, concerns over agency discretion—and 
 
(“Resilience scholars call on adaptive management to allow adjustment to the high degree of 
uncertainty associated with the complex interactions and feedbacks in a social-ecological system, 
an approach that would be necessary as nonstructural measures are implemented and their true 
impact measured.”); Barbara Cosens, Transboundary River Governance in the Face of Uncertainty: 
Resilience Theory and the Columbia River Treaty, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 229, 263 
(2010):  
[W]hile existing frameworks for agency management are appropriate for management 
and adaptive management in the face of predictable variability, the existing framework 
may not be appropriate for response in a complex system in which uncertainty is “not 
reducible by further research,” or . . . to “wicked” problems in which the actors are 
unable to agree on either the problem definition or the solution.  
See also Camacho, supra note 99, at 1415–16 (noting that “scholars and agencies increasingly 
endorse the incorporation of adaptive management to cope with the uncertainty likely to arise with 
climate change”); Camacho, supra note 37, at 10–13 (advocating more generally for adaptive 
governance). 
 157. Professor Karkkainen wrote:  
One might even envision administrative law proceeding on two tracks: ordinarily the 
familiar “fixed rule” track will apply, except in circumstances where the agency can 
justify, according to well-understood standards, shifting to the adaptive management 
track, and at that point a second set of adaptive management administrative law 
principles would kick in, requiring different procedures and further justifications for 
changes in the course of action.  
Karkkainen, supra note 45, at 75. Professor Karkkainen did not, however, actually propose such 
a statute. See also Ruhl, supra note 10, at 54 (suggesting that we are a long way from having a 
National Adaptive Management Act). 
 158. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 166 (noting that the “EPA’s uneasiness 
regarding the use of its administrative discretion undermined Project XL from its inception”). 
 159. E.g., ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1994) (holding that the 
National Labor Relations Board’s decision to award reinstatement and back pay was not an abuse 
of discretion despite the employee’s false testimony). 
 160. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Pan Am. Constr. Co., 338 So. 2d 1291, 1293–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1976) (holding that an agency cannot, by rule, expand its statutory authority), appeal 
dismissed, 345 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1977). 
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mechanisms to constrain that discretion—have been a substantial focus 
in administrative law from its creation.161 Given adaptive 
management’s value for the administrative toolbox, it would be far 
better to provide agencies with explicit statutory authority to engage in 
it162—statutory authority that simultaneously addresses the 
administrative law barriers to adaptive management identified in Part 
III. This Part begins by examining how an administrative law scheme 
that promotes adaptive management could simultaneously preserve 
and promote traditional administrative law values. It then examines 
what other features are necessary both to ensure that agencies engage 
in true adaptive management, not a/m lite, and to provide procedural 
safeguards against ineffective or damaging adaptive management 
experiments.163 
A. Preserving Traditional Administrative Law Values in the Adaptive 
Management Process 
Redesigning administrative law to allow for adaptive 
management does not require abandoning traditional administrative 
law values—quite the opposite. Indeed, commentators on adaptive 
management have identified public participation to be a critical 
component of any adaptive management scheme. In particular, they 
advocate public participation at critical stages of the project or 
management measure,164 access to judicial review,165 and provision for 
some sort of emergency outside intervention if the project or 
management measure’s implementation of adaptive management goes 
too far awry or actively undermines the substantive goals of the 
 
 161. Stewart, supra note 14, at 1676–82. 
 162. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 480–81 (“Only Congress can let agencies break out 
of the a/m-lite mold without fear of public, industry, and judicial pushback.”); Susskind & Secunda, 
supra note 18, at 166 (arguing for “passage of legislation specifically defining and authorizing 
[EPA’s Project XL] implementation,” which “would minimize the need for agency staff to squeeze 
XL experiments under the umbrella of tortured regulatory reinterpretation”). 
 163. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management in 
Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2010) (arguing that “[a]fter thirteen 
years and millions of dollars, the [Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Program] has failed to 
stabilize or otherwise improve the quality of the fragile downstream ecosystem”). 
 164. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 162–63, 164 (arguing that stakeholders should 
be encouraged to participate in individual projects and proposals, and suggesting the creation of a 
funding mechanism to help stakeholders lacking sufficient resources to participate). 
 165. Id. at 166 (arguing that “any affected party [should have statutory right to] petition to 
have the [EPA] project[s] stopped immediately in federal court”). 
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regulatory regime.166 Incorporating safeguard mechanisms such as 
these will support the legitimacy of adaptive management processes, 
without which adaptive management is doomed;167 the challenge will 
be not to smother adaptive management in the process. 
Finality is, perhaps obviously, the traditional administrative 
law value most in tension with adaptive management. Even here, 
however, we can accommodate traditional values, given that 
commentators expect visible progress toward, if not achievement of, 
stated goals within a reasonable period of time168—“reasonable” being 
judged by the management project’s scale. In other words, we should 
judge finality in this context not by the administrative process itself, 
but rather by the goals that the adaptive management project is trying 
to achieve. 
The key to preserving these administrative law values while 
allowing agencies to implement true adaptive management is for 
administrative law to embrace and absorb adaptive management’s 
periodicity. Specifically, we should recast administrative procedure not 
as a one-time, final-agency-decision-then-judicial-review process, but 
rather as a recurring process of punctuated “final” decisionmaking, 
public participation, and judicial review somewhat akin to continuing 
jurisdiction in the courts. Reenvisioned in this light, administrative law 
can actually better hold agencies accountable to their adaptive 
management responsibilities while simultaneously providing for more 
public participation and judicial oversight than the current a/m lite 
compromise allows. 
1. Public Participation 
While, as noted above, traditional administrative law provisions 
governing public participation are generally considered a barrier to 
agency use of true adaptive management,169 it is worth emphasizing 
 
 166. See id. at 165–66 (arguing that proposed legislation allowing for adaptive management 
in environmental compliance through Project XL should provide that “EPA and/or a state 
environmental authority can unilaterally order the experiment to cease”). 
 167. See Barbara A. Cosens, Legitimacy, Adaptation, and Resilience in Ecosystem 
Management, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2013, at art. 3, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety 
.org/vol18/iss1/art3/ (examining theories of legitimacy in the context of adaptive management). 
 168. See, e.g., Susskind et al., supra note 163, at 4–5 (explicitly expecting progress toward 
ecological improvement after thirteen years of adaptive management efforts in Glen Canyon). 
 169. At this point, it is necessary to distinguish agency-based adaptive management, which is 
what this Article focuses on, from collaborative adaptive management, which purposely involves 
stakeholders in every aspect of adaptive management decisionmaking. Public participation—or, 
more precisely, stakeholder participation—is far broader and more continuous in collaborative 
adaptive management. As a result, additional procedures are recommended to prevent the 
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again that many proponents of adaptive management deem public 
participation to be critical to the project’s success.170 Thus, the issue of 
public participation in agency adaptive management should not be 
framed in terms of whether the public gets to participate in the agency’s 
decisionmaking, but rather when. Public input for every agency 
adjustment to an adaptive management project or management plan 
would undermine the agency’s ability to implement the lessons it learns 
in real time and bog down the implementation of adaptive management 
in the various processes of public participation (notice and comment, 
collaborative decisionmaking, judicial review), potentially derailing the 
whole project. As a result, in administrative law terms, these 
adjustments to a preexisting adaptive management plan should not be 
considered agency “actions” that trigger public participation 
requirements. 
Nevertheless, formulation of the plan itself is clearly an adaptive 
management moment that lends itself to public input. Similarly, 
adaptive management’s requirement that agencies engage in periodic 
evaluations of their progress toward preidentified goals, and hence that 
they periodically comprehensively adjust the management measures 
that they are employing, provides additional perfect moments for 
recurring, rather than continual, public participation. 
By focusing on adaptive management as an iterative process, 
amendments to administrative law that insist that agencies engage in 
proper adaptive management, rather than a/m lite, could actually 
increase public participation in adaptive management exercises by 
providing multiple (but punctuated) opportunities for public 
involvement as the project evolves over time. Rather than forcing 
agencies who implement adaptive management (or, rather, a/m lite) to 
delineate the full range of administrative discretion all at once, 
reformed procedures would require agencies to periodically evaluate 
and adjust their adaptive management projects and management 
measures, subject to public notice and comment. The length of the 
period between comprehensive reevaluations could vary by context, but 
in most cases should be no longer than five years. In between, the 
agency’s implementation of its adaptive management plan would be, 
essentially, “hands off”—although public reporting requirements at 
 
collaboration from bogging down or from becoming dominated by one perspective. See Susskind et 
al., supra note 163, at 30–54 (discussing these procedural “best practices” in the context of the 
Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Program). 
 170. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 162–63, 164 (arguing that “ongoing and 
meaningful” participation by all relevant stakeholders was critical to the improvement and success 
of the EPA’s Project XL). 
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regular intervals could both facilitate continual public monitoring and 
provide a basis for emergency intervention. 
2. Judicial Review 
As with public participation, the question regarding judicial 
review of agency adaptive management is not a question of whether 
there should be judicial review, but rather when. In current APA terms, 
not every agency action in an adaptive management project should be 
considered “final agency action” subject to judicial review. “Dial 
adjustments” in accordance with an adaptive management plan that 
has itself been subject to judicial review do not, themselves, need to be 
subject to further judicial review. 
As a result, the availability of judicial review of adaptive 
management should largely track the availability of public 
participation. Judicial review thus would be cyclical, generally 
available only during the project-review phase and as part of the 
formulation of the next plan. In other words, judicial review should be 
available after the agency has summarized and reviewed its monitoring 
data and formulated—subject to public notice and public 
participation—its adaptive management plan for the next cycle of 
implementation. Review of the adaptive management plan would be 
based on existing standards of administrative judicial review: 
conformance with administrative procedural requirements; compliance 
with substantive statutory requirements (especially with respect to 
management goals); compliance with prior monitoring plans; and the 
reasonableness of the new adaptive management plan in light of prior 
monitoring, best available science, or other relevant data and overall 
management goals. 
Of course, there is always the possibility that an agency’s 
implementation of its adaptive management plan will go horribly awry. 
It may just be, for example, that despite the agency’s “best guess” at 
how to proceed, the complex system does not respond as expected—
indeed, it may instead respond in a way that puts the entire system at 
risk. Alternatively, emergency or unforeseen circumstances may render 
an agency’s existing adaptive management plan moot or futile. For 
example, the 2008 housing and financial crisis changed various aspects 
of the real estate, banking, and securities systems throughout the world 
and was deemed by many to warrant emergency intervention.171 In the 
 
 171. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of 
Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 852–68 (2012) (assessing 
causes of the financial crisis including failures in regulation); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE 
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realm of natural resources management, in contrast, climate change is 
likely to increasingly require the overhaul of overall management goals 
for particular species and ecosystems.172 Finally, as in any 
administrative law context, the agency may simply fail to do any of 
what it is supposed to be doing, effectively abandoning its adaptive 
management plan. 
As a result, the administrative law governing agency adaptive 
management needs an “escape valve”—a means of allowing outside 
intervention (most likely in the form of a judicial injunction) or an 
abrupt change of course within the agency itself when adaptive 
management projects are going badly awry or when unforeseen 
emergencies arise. Of course, if not tightly controlled, this escape valve 
runs the risk of undermining the basic purpose of designing a special 
administrative law for adaptive management by allowing discontented 
litigants to challenge the agency’s implementation of its adaptive 
management plan at any point in the implementation period.173 To 
avoid this outcome, legislatures should enact strict criteria for 
emergency intervention, especially for outsider challenges in court, and 
make it clear in the statute itself that these criteria are to be strictly 
construed against court intervention. Formulating strict standards that 
can still apply broadly to a variety of different types of agencies, though, 
will be difficult, regardless of the care in drafting. Hence, a heavy 
burden of proof (either beyond a reasonable doubt or clear and 
convincing evidence) and strict standard for judicial action (strict 
scrutiny) can best effectuate the goal of keeping the opportunity for 
emergency intervention narrow. Nevertheless, out of deference to the 
 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (same); Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: 
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1352 (2011) (same); Manuel A. 
Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779 (2011) (same). 
 172. See, e.g., Susskind et al., supra note 163, at 28 (noting that, in the Glen Canyon system, 
“[t]he precarious state of the downriver ecology is particularly disconcerting because anticipated 
stressors, such as climate change, are likely to strain the ecosystem even further” and that studies 
indicate that the Colorado River and its reservoirs could dry up entirely by 2057); see also Mark 
Squillace & Alexander Hood, NEPA, Climate Change, and Public Lands Decision Making, 42 
ENVTL. L. 469, 474 (2012) (proposing that adaptive management become a required approach 
under NEPA as a result of climate change); Rhett B. Larson, Innovation and International 
Commons: The Case of Desalination Under International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 800 
(“Adaptive management has become a central feature of climate change policy debates, as 
policymakers must respond to a changing environment and a better understanding of climate 
change through improved modeling.”); Craig, supra note 49, at 15, 17, 39, 65–67 (repeatedly 
positing adaptive management as a salutary tool for climate change adaptation). 
 173. For example, Susskind et al. have described the debilitating effects of continual legal 
challenges to the Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Program. Susskind et al., supra note 163, 
at 26–27. 
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agency’s expertise, slightly less stringent criteria should apply to the 
agency’s own determination that it needs to change course. Again, 
however, the statutory presumption should be against abandoning the 
current adaptive management plan midcourse unless there are clear 
and convincing reasons for doing so. 
3. Finality 
Unlike traditional agency decisionmaking in rulemaking and 
adjudication, adaptive management decisionmaking by its very nature 
is not—or at least not immediately—final. The question, therefore, is 
how to balance adaptive management’s fluidity and flexibility with the 
law’s demand for some sense of finality. As a practical matter, 
“[a]daptive management cannot, of course, be constantly changing; it is 
public regulation that must satisfy constitutional requirements of 
substantive and procedural due process.”174 These concerns are 
particularly acute when an agency’s implementation of adaptive 
management affects not just its own direct regulatory or management 
actions but also the conditions and requirements imposed on regulated 
entities.175 Conversely, adaptive management does not lend itself to the 
one-time “final finality” that is the goal of both administrative process 
and American law more generally.176 
Fortunately, adaptive management readily lends itself to 
periodic “reset points.” Specifically, adaptive management is already 
conceived of as an iterative process where progress depends on these 
reflective “pause points” that allow or require the managing entity—
here, the administrative agency—to evaluate past actions and reassess 
its future course. These pause points provide apt moments for the public 
processes of administrative law to intervene in an ongoing process of 
adaptive management, satisfying needs for temporary certainty 
regarding the agency’s next course of action as well as allowing for 
meaningful public participation and judicial review. 
It is important to recognize, however, that adaptive 
management temporally separates two aspects of agency finality that 
are generally united in front-end, binary agency decisionmaking. The 
first aspect of finality is the completion of the decisionmaking process 
itself—the end of a rulemaking, the order in an agency adjudication, the 
 
 174. Tarlock, supra note 136, at 1141; see also Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 478 
(acknowledging “that the scope of adaptive management is not boundless”). 
 175. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 477 (“Private regulated interests have expressed 
concerns about the capacity of adaptive management to add continually to the conditions imposed 
by resource development authorizations without the security of finality.”). 
 176. See id. at 429 (describing adaptive management as evolutionary and iterative). 
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final decree in court after the last possibility of appeal has expired. 
Administrative law for adaptive management preserves this sense of 
finality by focusing on each round of the agency’s adaptive management 
plan as a legally final “event”: absent the emergencies described above, 
at the end of the judicial review period, the adaptive management plan 
will govern the management measure or project at issue for the time 
period designated—generally one to five years, but perhaps longer for 
larger and more complex management activities. 
However, by definition, each iteration of an adaptive 
management plan probably will not be the substantively final 
implementation of overall legislative intent or policy goals, which 
compose the second aspect of finality in agencies’ traditional decisions. 
When the FDA decides to approve a new drug for human use, it has 
definitively decided—at least based on the evidence currently 
available—that the drug meets the substantive-law requirements for 
efficacy and safety. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers decides to 
dredge a harbor, it has definitively decided that the dredging will 
advance the Rivers and Harbors Act’s goal of improving navigation. 
Indeed, this alignment of the agency’s final decision and the statute’s 
substantive goals is the basis of arbitrary and capricious review in 
administrative law. 
Judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
however, has always suggested that there is a lurking issue in much 
agency decisionmaking regarding how confident an agency has to be 
that its proposed implementation of a statute will actually accomplish 
what the agency thinks it will and hence advance the legislature’s 
overall goals and purposes. For example, under the federal Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,177 regional 
Fishery Management Councils must establish measures designed to 
recover a “depleted” fishery,178 and these measures often include fishing 
quotas. The U.S. Court of Appeals found unreasonable a fishing quota 
that had only an 18% chance of recovering the relevant fishery, 
commenting that “[o]nly in Superman Comics’ Bizarro world, where 
reality is turned upside down, could the Service reasonably conclude 
that a measure that is at least four times as likely to fail as to succeed 
offers a ‘fairly high level of confidence.’ ”179 More generally, clashes over 
this “confidence” issue may be one indication that adaptive 
management may be a better course for the agency decisions at issue. 
 
 177. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–83 (2012). 
 178. See id. § 1851(a)(1) (requiring measures to prevent overfishing). 
 179. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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A special legal track for adaptive management would therefore 
be more transparent than current administrative law regarding the 
agency’s ability to meet (and its process for achieving) legislative goals, 
at least to the extent that the adaptive management plans required in 
the proposed new track lay bare the agency’s degree of uncertainty 
regarding specific management measures and its plans for actively 
improving the efficacy of its management “best guesses.” Nevertheless, 
substantive finality (or at least the illusion of substantive finality) is 
purposely put off until some point in the future, if it can be “finally final” 
at all. This poses two implications for administrative law. First, as will 
be discussed in the next Section, administrative law for adaptive 
management needs to provide a procedure whereby an agency can take 
a project off the adaptive management track—most likely because the 
agency has resolved, through trial and error, all or most of the 
uncertainties that were making management difficult, in situations 
where continual change is not a complicating factor. Second, in judicial 
review of adaptive management plans, arbitrary and capricious review 
cannot be based on the agency’s certainty of achieving overall 
management goals in the next round of implementation. Instead, 
judicial review should evaluate the reasonableness of the adaptive 
management plan in making progress toward those overall 
management goals in terms of resolving recognized uncertainties in the 
management problem, improving basic information regarding the 
system’s function and complexity, and measuring ongoing changes to 
the system. 
In other words, an adaptive management plan should be judged 
adequately “final” if it proposes a well-defined and reasonable 
experiment that will result in progress—theory confirmation or 
falsification, increased knowledge of basic system features that are 
relevant to the management objective, and so on—toward the overall 
legislative goal. And, indeed, this is how most advocates of adaptive 
management think about finality in this context.180 Administrative law 
can further the improved use of adaptive management by doing the 
same. 
B. Designing Administrative Law Specifically for Adaptive 
Management 
Beyond the traditional administrative law values, 
commentators who have argued for experiments in adaptive 
 
 180. See, e.g., Susskind et al., supra note 163, at 24–25 (evaluating the Glen Canyon Adaptive 
Management Program in terms of progress toward its announced goals). 
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management have agreed that certain features are critical. These 
features should be incorporated into any legislation explicitly allowing 
for adaptive management. They include (1) criteria for defining what 
sorts of projects or management measures qualify for the special 
legislation;181 (2) definition of project or management-measure goals 
and their relative priorities;182 and (3) objective monitoring of the 
project or management measure implementing adaptive 
management,183 with progress measured against concrete standards.184 
To achieve the goal of allowing agencies to engage in true adaptive 
management, moreover, agency decisionmaking following the adaptive 
management track should generally be free of additional external 
procedural requirements.185 In the federal system, these include the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and its requirement for 
an Environmental Impact Statement;186 the ESA’s “jeopardy” 
consultations and habitat conservation plan requirements;187 and 
multiple rounds of regulatory impact analyses, including cost-benefit 
analyses. Finally, the new administrative procedures should allow 
agencies to end the adaptive management process when the agency’s 
implementation measures achieve stable results that meet a 
predetermined goal or when it becomes clear that adaptive 
management is not working. This Section describes in turn each of 
these features of the proposed new Model Adaptive Management 
Procedure Act (“MAMPA”). 
 
 181. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 18, at 166 (suggesting five criteria for proposed 
projects). 
 182. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 424, 472, 482; see also COMM. ON ENDANGERED & 
THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, supra note 20, at 332–335; cf. Susskind et al., 
supra note 163, at 6, 25 (criticizing the lack of clearly stated goals for the Glen Canyon Dam 
project). 
 183. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 424; see also COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED 
FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, supra note 20, at 332–35; Susskind & Secunda, supra note 
18, at 166, 169, 170. 
 184. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 482; see also COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED 
FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, supra note 20, at 332–35; Susskind & Secunda, supra note 
18, at 164–65, 170 (advocating the use of ISO environmental management standards as a 
benchmark for assessing the success of Project XL adaptive management proposals and arguing 
that continuous evaluation is “crucial”). 
 185. See, e.g., Schultz & Nie, supra note 38, at 444 (noting that compliance with other 
procedural requirements, especially NEPA, poses a real challenge to implementing adaptive 
management). 
 186. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012) (requiring all federal agencies to produce environmental-
impact reports for major federal actions). 
 187. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a), 1539(a) (requiring federal agencies to consult with the Secretary 
of the Interior or Secretary of Commerce regarding projects that could jeopardize endangered 
species and allowing the Secretary to take actions necessary to maintain populations). 
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1. Getting on the Adaptive Management Track: Three Pathways 
Establishing an alternative set of administrative law procedures 
for adaptive management—what we have been calling the adaptive 
management track—necessarily creates the issue of how to determine 
whether an agency can use the alternative track for a particular 
decisionmaking process. This question, in turn, depends upon whether 
the relevant legislature has specified what the agency is to do or 
whether the choice is the agency’s own, resulting in three potential 
situations regarding the agency’s ability to use the adaptive 
management track. Section 2 of the MAMPA addresses these three 
situations. 
First, the legislature might definitively require an agency to use 
adaptive management for a specific management context or set of 
management decisions. Second, and conversely, the legislature might 
expressly forbid an agency from using adaptive management for 
particular kinds of decisions or for any decision. In either of these two 
cases, the legislature’s pronouncement would be final, and the roles of 
the agency and courts in evaluating the propriety of the adaptive 
management track would be minimal, particularly when the legislature 
has expressed itself clearly. 
Third, the legislature might leave the choice of whether to use 
the adaptive management track to the agency, either expressly or 
through statutory silence on the issue. We generally deem statutory 
silence and express statutory delegation of the decision to choose the 
adaptive management track to the agency as legally equivalent, which 
both (1) pragmatically avoids requiring the legislature to amend all 
prior statutes to address the adaptive management possibility before 
an agency can opt into the adaptive management track and 
(2) acknowledges agencies’ potentially greater expertise regarding the 
issue of when adaptive management would be desirable and 
appropriate substantively and contextually. However, we also 
acknowledge that requiring the legislature to give the agency express 
permission to use the adaptive management track would eliminate 
several threshold legal issues, such as evaluating whether adaptive 
management is appropriate for the management project at issue, an 
option that states in particular might find attractive. 
When an agency has the option of deciding whether to pursue 
the adaptive management track, the MAMPA requires the agency to 
make a positive decision to do so through standard notice-and-comment 
(informal) rulemaking. In so doing, the MAMPA constructs standard 
administrative procedures as the default rule: federal agencies, for 
example, would follow the APA unless Congress clearly instructs 
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otherwise or Congress has allowed the agency the choice (or is silent on 
the issue) and the agency decides to pursue the adaptive management 
track. This default preserves administrative law’s status quo and hence 
minimizes overall disruption when a legislature decides to introduce 
the adaptive management track. The default rule also reflects our sense 
that use of the adaptive management track will in fact be less frequent 
and less appropriate than use of standard administrative procedures in 
most agency decisionmaking. 
In making a decision to use the adaptive management track, the 
agency must demonstrate, based on “the best evidence available,” that 
the project or management activity at issue is appropriate for adaptive 
management, using the factors and considerations that we identified in 
Part II. The “best evidence available” standard is intended to prevent 
courts from requiring agencies to have perfect information regarding 
the suitability of adaptive management, while the factors are intended 
to ensure that the agency can nevertheless demonstrate a good fit 
between the project or management activity and the basic goals and 
constraints of adaptive management. 
As specified in Section 6 of the MAMPA, the agency’s decision to 
use the adaptive management track, expressed in a final rule, is 
judicially reviewable but subject to a ninety-day statute of limitations. 
The short statute of limitations limits the time delay between an 
agency’s decision to use adaptive management and its ability to actually 
begin the adaptive management process if there are no challenges to 
the propriety of its decision. If judicial review is sought, however, the 
reviewing court (we propose for federal agencies the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals) can assess both the legislature’s intent regarding adaptive 
management and the propriety—under standard arbitrary and 
capricious review—of the agency’s decision to use adaptive 
management for the particular project or management activity at issue. 
Judicial review for alleged procedural and constitutional violations is 
also available. 
Finally, an agency’s decision to use the adaptive management 
track would be subject to all other applicable procedural and evaluative 
requirements that would normally apply to agency rulemaking under 
the appropriate state or federal laws. For federal agencies, for example, 
the agency’s initial decision to use the adaptive management track 
could thus be subject to various cost-benefit analyses188 and review by 
 
 188. E.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1532, 1535 (2012) (requiring cost-
benefit analyses for rulemaking resulting in spending of $100 million or more in the government 
and private sectors in a given year and requiring consideration of reasonable alternatives). 
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the Office of Management and Budget,189 various regulatory-impact 
analyses,190 environmental impact assessment requirements under 
NEPA,191 or consultation requirements under the ESA.192 Subjecting 
the agency’s decision to these traditional requirements both reflects the 
MAMPA’s provision that normal administrative law procedures remain 
the default set of requirements and ensures at the outset that the 
agency’s decision to change procedural tracks will not in and of itself 
violate existing statutory and executive limitations on agency actions. 
2. Formulating the Initial Adaptive Management Plan: Goals, 
Monitoring, and Standards 
Once an agency’s project or management action, or category of 
projects or management actions, is subject to the adaptive management 
track, the first step is for the agency to adopt its initial adaptive 
management plan. Section 3 of the MAMPA addresses this step. 
In order to avoid the re-creation of a/m lite, the MAMPA subjects 
agencies to a rigorous planning requirement that details the necessary 
elements of true adaptive management. First, as adaptive management 
theory demands, the agency must identify specific management goals 
and objectives, both for the system overall and for its initial 
management measures. These goals and objectives provide the overall 
measures against which both the agency and the courts can measure 
progress in the adaptive management process. 
Second, the agency must identify, to the extent possible, 
potential threats to its management goals and potential stressors and 
perturbations to the managed system. Identifying these threats, 
stressors, and perturbations from the beginning will help the agency to 
define and adjust its management measures. Doing so can also help to 
define potential events that might require abrupt changes in the 
 
 189. E.g., Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 
30, 1993) (requiring federal agencies engaged in “significant” regulatory action to submit their 
proposed rules to the Office of Management and Budget for review).  
 190. E.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.  §§ 601–12 (2012) (requiring a federal agency to 
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis of any rule subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements under the APA or any other statute unless the agency certifies that the rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities); Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 
6, 2000) (requiring federal agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure “meaningful and 
timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal 
implications”); Federalism, Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (requiring 
federal agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure “meaningful and timely input by State 
and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications”).  
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
 192. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2012). 
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agency’s adaptive management plan or that might even render the 
system no longer amenable to adaptive management in general. 
Third, the agency must identify relevant indicators in the 
system, both generally and for this round’s monitoring plan. Indicators 
are the system components that the agency will monitor throughout the 
adaptive management process to gauge its progress toward its 
management goals. As a result, the indicators chosen must give the 
agency an ability to comprehensively and meaningfully assess the 
system and how it is changing in light of the management objectives. 
Fourth, the agency must develop a monitoring plan. The 
monitoring plan must be defensible under the best practices of the 
professional discipline most relevant to the project or management 
action (for example, a forest-management action would turn to biology). 
It must also use a standardized and accepted methodology that the 
agency implements consistently so that the agency can compare the 
resulting data over time. In addition, the agency must provide for the 
periodic release of monitoring data to the general public in a 
comprehensible and usable form. The MAMPA suggests that such 
public reports on the agency’s activities be spaced no more than six 
months apart, although we acknowledge that longer or shorter periods 
might be appropriate for different kinds of agency activities. The 
legislature, of course, remains free to specify different times for 
different agency management situations. 
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the agency must identify 
in its initial adaptive management plan changes in indicator statuses 
that are relevant to evaluating its progress toward the identified 
management objectives.193 Specifically, the agency must describe 
changes in the indicators that would suggest that either the system is 
moving in a positive direction (i.e., toward achieving management 
goals) or that the system is moving in a negative direction. As part of 
this process, the agency must also identify means by which it can 
determine whether the changes in the indicators are in fact caused by 
its management measures or by other factors (or some combination). 
Finally, the agency should identify changes in system indicators, 
individually and collectively, so negative that they counsel in favor of 
aborting the current management plan. These “abort indicators” will 
become the primary measures through which either the agency can 
justify abrupt changes in its adaptive management plan or the general 
 
 193. See Schultz & Nie, supra note 38, at 444–45, 455–64, 469–91 (advocating the use of 
“triggers” in agency implementation in adaptive management for reasons similar to those that 
prompt us to require the agency to specify various criteria for evaluating its actions and for 
aborting current management activities). 
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public can justify emergency intervention; they also provide one 
measure through which the agency can reassess whether adaptive 
management was an appropriate decisionmaking process in the first 
place. 
The agency adopts its initial adaptive management plan—and 
every subsequent adaptive management plan—through notice-and-
comment rulemaking. As such, the process of formulating each adaptive 
management plan is subject to public notice, comment, and hearings 
when appropriate, just as under traditional administrative law. The 
MAMPA expands upon this traditional public participation, however, 
by requiring that the agency also actively invite more public 
involvement in the plan’s formulation through representatives of 
interest groups and stakeholders. The requirement, specifically, is that 
the agency make reasonable efforts to involve and accommodate these 
groups. However, the Act also leaves the agency with considerable 
discretion to limit the number of participants to a level that will be both 
manageable and helpful. The intention, as adaptive management 
theory recommends, is for agencies to involve interested stakeholders, 
through their representatives, in plan formulation earlier in the process 
than standard notice-and-comment rulemaking would allow. 
The agency’s initial adaptive management plan is subject to 
fairly standard judicial review, but with two innovations to current APA 
requirements. First, judicial review is subject to a short (thirty-day) 
statute of limitations. This short window is intended both to recognize 
that increased stakeholder participation in the planning process will 
ideally eliminate many conflicts, reducing the need for extensive 
judicial review, and to encourage stakeholders and the interested public 
to keep a close eye on agency adaptive management efforts. Second, 
courts engaged in judicial review of agency adaptive management plans 
now have, through the MAMPA’s section 3 requirements, a substantial 
structural guide for ensuring that agencies are engaged in “proper” 
adaptive management, because failure to include or adequately explain 
any required plan element would be grounds for remanding the entire 
plan to the agency. In other words, the MAMPA teaches courts how 
agencies should be implementing proper adaptive management. 
One final aspect of the procedures for the initial adaptive 
management plan is worth noting. The MAMPA generally exempts 
agency adaptive management plans from the substantive and 
procedural requirements of any statutes, regulations, or executive 
orders other than the statute that authorized the agency to engage in 
the relevant management activities in the first place (but, as explained 
above, not the initial decision to choose the adaptive management 
track). As such, once an agency is on the adaptive management track, 
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it is free from confining and occasionally derailing ongoing procedural 
requirements—including but not limited to NEPA environmental 
analysis requirements, ESA consultation requirements, and OMB 
review and associated cost-benefit analysis requirements—unless the 
agency’s authorizing statute provides otherwise. This exemption is 
intended to provide agencies with an incentive for engaging in the 
rigorous process of adaptive management planning and 
implementation. Notably, however, nothing in the MAMPA prohibits 
agencies from following these requirements voluntarily, and the 
relevant legislature can always specifically require continued 
compliance for particular agency adaptive management processes. 
3. The Implementation Phase and Emergency Interventions 
In one of its most important innovations for administrative 
procedure, the MAMPA specifies that once an agency is actually 
implementing an adaptive management plan, no judicial review of its 
interim decisions is available unless emergency intervention is 
appropriate. In more traditional administrative law terms, the 
implementation phase is considered “committed to agency discretion by 
law,” with limited exceptions. The MAMPA underscores this 
commitment to agency discretion by specifying that, in general, 
challengers will not be entitled to their costs or to attorney fee awards 
in lawsuits filed during the implementation period even if they are 
successful, removing one incentive for implementation period litigation. 
As has been discussed, this freedom from judicial review during the 
implementation phase is necessary for true adaptive management to 
occur. However, the elimination of judicial review that the MAMPA 
provides also offers agencies an additional incentive for using the 
adaptive management track when it is appropriate. 
The general unreviewability of the implementation phase under 
the MAMPA gives agencies considerable discretion to pursue adaptive 
management, correcting one of the most important limitations of 
conventional administrative law for adaptive management. 
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this increase in agency discretion 
will make many people and interest groups uncomfortable.194 To 
 
 194. See id. at 444; see also Neil Green Nylen, Note, To Achieve Biodiversity Goals, the New 
Forest Service Planning Rule Needs Effective Mandates for Best Available Science and Adaptive 
Management, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 245 n.22 (2011) (“This need to balance structure with 
discretion is an across-the-board concern in administrative law.” (citation omitted)). Notably, 
however, Emily Hammond and Dave Markell have recently examined how agencies can legitimize 
their behavior even in the absence of judicial review—what they term “legitimacy from the inside-
out.” See generally Hammond & Markell, supra note 117. This Article accepts their premise that 
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mitigate this discomfort while still providing agencies with what we 
consider necessary additional discretion, the MAMPA provides 
mechanisms whereby interested members of the public can keep an eye 
on what the agency is doing during the implementation phase and can 
intervene in true emergencies or if the agency has completely 
abandoned the project. First, the agency must provide the general 
public with its monitoring data in an understandable and usable form 
at least every six months. Second, the agency must report to the general 
public at least once per year regarding how it is implementing its 
adaptive management plan (including adjustments that it has made to 
its management measures). If the agency fails to provide monitoring 
data or required reports within two months of their due dates, members 
of the public can sue for the limited purpose of compelling production. 
Third, either members of the public or the agency itself can abort the 
current adaptive management plan under two circumstances: (1) the 
system achieves the abort indicator statuses designated in the 
management plan; or (2) an unanticipated severe disturbance occurs in 
the system, such as an unanticipated natural disaster, economic 
collapse, or act of war or terrorism. Finally, if the agency clearly and 
completely abandons its adaptive management plan (as narrowly 
defined in the MAMPA’s judicial review provisions in section 6), 
members of the public can sue the agency to compel compliance or to 
force the agency to formally abandon the adaptive management track. 
However, if the court dismisses any such lawsuit because the agency 
actually is acting, the agency is entitled to its costs and attorney fees. 
This provision of MAMPA is intended to underscore the narrowly 
tailored nature of the “abandonment” cause of action. 
As part of their adaptive management plans, agencies must 
identify abort indicators (MAMPA sections 3(B), 4(B)). Abort indicators 
are a specified set of monitored statuses that, if they occur either 
collectively or individually, signal to the agency that its management 
measures are taking the system grossly off any path toward achieving 
its management goals. During the planning-period rulemaking, the 
agency must explain and justify the abort indicators it chooses, and 
these abort indicators are subject to judicial review. As a result, 
achievement of the abort indicators should signal to both the agency 
and the general public that the current adaptive management plan 
should be terminated—unless, as the MAMPA makes clear, the agency 
can attribute those indicator statuses to the occurrence of an 
 
agency legitimacy can exist even in the absence of judicial review, and we have structured our 
vision of agency adaptive management plans to help build such legitimacy during the 
implementation phase, despite increased agency discretion. 
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unexpected and temporary perturbation to the system whose effects are 
not expected to be permanent or long lasting. 
Under sections 3(C)(1), 4(C)(1), and 5(B) of the MAMPA, if the 
abort indicators are achieved, the agency can terminate the 
management plan simply by giving notice in the Federal Register (or 
the state equivalent) and waiting thirty days; no rulemaking is required 
for termination, although it will be required for the new adaptive 
management plan, which is subject to the provisions of section 4. 
Alternatively, under section 5(D), members of the public can file a 
mandamus action in federal district court or the designated state court 
(subject to any jurisdictional limitations such as standing and the 
traditional requirements and limitations governing mandamus). Both 
the agency, if its decision is challenged as allowed in section 6, and 
mandamus petitioners must prove the case for termination by clear and 
convincing evidence, an evidentiary standard imposed to better ensure 
that termination is in fact warranted. Mandamus petitioners are also 
subject to additional procedural requirements to ensure that such court 
actions are rare and do not interfere with the agency’s own decision to 
terminate. 
Given that the agency must identify “expected” conditions for 
termination of the adaptive management plan through the abort 
indicators, we purposely designed the MAMPA’s provision for “true” 
emergency termination in sections 5(C) and 5(E) to be extremely 
limited; moreover, the statute instructs the courts to narrowly interpret 
these provisions. To terminate agency implementation because of an 
emergency, either the agency or members of the public petitioning for 
mandamus must show that (1) a severe disturbance to the system 
occurred, (2) the adaptive management plan did not anticipate the 
disturbance, and (3) the disturbance fundamentally altered the 
information or system status that formed the basis of the adaptive 
management plan. Again, the agency can terminate its implementation 
merely by publishing notice in the Federal Register and waiting thirty 
days, but its decision is subject to judicial review under section 6. In 
addition, again, both the agency (if its decision is challenged) and the 
mandamus petitioners must prove their cases by clear and convincing 
evidence, and mandamus petitioners are subject to additional 
requirements intended to limit their ability to interfere with the 
agency’s own decisionmaking. 
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4. Resetting at the Pause Point: Review, Evaluation, and the Next 
Round of Adaptive Management 
The agency’s implementation of its current adaptive 
management plan will eventually end, at which point the agency 
proceeds to the steps of evaluating the data gathered, reviewing its 
management options, and proposing a new adaptive management plan 
for the next round of management-measure implementation. The 
MAMPA envisions three “natural” termination triggers for ending the 
implementation period, spelled out in sections 3(C) and 4(C). First, as 
discussed in the previous Section, the agency should terminate its 
adaptive management plan when the system achieves the abort 
indicators. Second, and conversely, the system might achieve the plan’s 
“finished indicators.” Like the abort indicators, finished indicators are 
specific statuses identified in the adaptive management plan that the 
monitored indicators might achieve during the course of the 
implementation period. However, unlike abort indicators, finished 
indicators are signals that the agency’s current management measures 
have done their job—assuming that no other cause explains their 
achievement—and that it is time for the agency to make additional 
progress toward its ultimate management goals. Third, the 
implementation period might end simply as a result of the passage of 
time. In the absence of an express, legislatively imposed time limit on 
the implementation period, the MAMPA requires the agency to choose 
and justify an appropriate length of time as part of the adaptive 
management plan, and that time limit would govern termination. 
However, the MAMPA also imposes a default outer limit of five years 
for any implementation period. 
Through section 4, the MAMPA presumes that the agency will 
continue through successive rounds of adaptive management plans. 
The agency adopts subsequent plans, like the first, through notice-and-
comment rulemaking, subject to the same additional public 
participation requirements, substantive plan-component requirements, 
and judicial review. However, after the first round of implementing 
adaptive management, the agency must also (1) explain what it has 
learned about managing the system, both in the immediately previous 
implementation period and over the entire adaptive management 
process; (2) adopt new management measures based on that evaluation; 
and (3) explain any and all changes to the adaptive management plan 
based on new information, changes to the system or its components, or 
changes to the law that the agency is implementing. 
Once the agency adopts a new adaptive management plan (and 
survives any judicial review), it proceeds into a new implementation 
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period. It continues through rounds of planning and implementation 
until it has reason and the legal ability to remove the project, 
management action, or category of projects or management actions, 
from the adaptive management track. 
5. Getting Off the Adaptive Management Track Once on It 
Some agency management situations may be so subject to 
continual change that there is no reason for the agency to ever take its 
management action off the adaptive management track. In these 
situations, adaptive management becomes the single best means of 
managing the system. Public lands managers, for example, may well 
find that perpetual adaptive management best enables them to cope 
with the continual and escalating impacts of climate change on the 
relevant ecosystems. And, as we have already discussed, the Federal 
Reserve (although outside the standard administrative law system) is 
effectively perpetually pursuing adaptive management with respect to 
interest rates. 
For other management situations, though, the initial problems, 
such as lack of basic information about the system or how it responds 
to various management measures, can actually be solved through 
adaptive management, allowing the agency to stabilize both the system 
and its management activities. At that point, the agency may find that 
the adaptive management track is no longer necessary or helpful. 
Alternatively, after a few rounds of adaptive management, the 
agency may find that the system or the management problem is not, 
after all, amenable to adaptive management. If it was the agency that 
decided to pursue the adaptive management track in the first place, and 
it has made a good faith effort to use adaptive management, albeit to 
little avail, it should have the option to remove its project or activity 
from the adaptive management track. 
Section 4 of the MAMPA outlines four situations in which 
leaving the adaptive management track is appropriate. First, Congress 
or the relevant state legislature may have intervened since the agency 
began its adaptive management process and ordered the agency to take 
its project or management action off the adaptive management track. 
Agencies must, of course, comply with these new legislative mandates. 
Second, even if Congress or the state legislature required the 
agency to use adaptive management, it may also have specified when 
the agency would be “done.” If the agency’s adaptively refined 
management measures have achieved the legislative criteria for leaving 
the adaptive management track, the agency can—and possibly must—
do so. 
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Third, even when an agency chose the adaptive management 
track, it may be able to identify clear criteria for when the adaptive 
management process would have stably achieved all management 
goals. If the adaptive management process brings the agency to the 
point where its management measures meet these criteria, and if the 
agency can now stably manage the system and maintain the applicable 
management goals, it may conclude that the adaptive management 
track has served its purpose and that it can now operate effectively 
through traditional front-loaded administrative rulemaking and 
planning. The MAMPA allows agencies in this situation to leave the 
adaptive management track. 
Finally, an agency that initially showed that its management 
situation fit the criteria in section 2 of the MAMPA for entering the 
adaptive management track may find that, in reality, adaptive 
management is not working after all. The MAMPA effectively requires 
that the agency make a good faith effort at using adaptive management. 
However, if the agency can show that (1) its reasonable management 
measures repeatedly take the system to the point where the abort 
indicators are achieved, (2) the system has changed significantly since 
the agency decided to pursue the adaptive management track, or 
(3) new information gathered in the process of adaptive management 
significantly undermines the agency’s initial conclusion that adaptive 
management is appropriate, then the agency can leave the adaptive 
management track. 
Section 4(A) of the MAMPA requires the agency to make and 
justify through notice-and-comment rulemaking its decision to take a 
project or management action off the adaptive management track. The 
final rule is subject to fairly standard judicial review requirements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For two reasons, experiments with adaptive management in the 
field have thus far failed to live up to the promise of adaptive 
management in theory. One is that adaptive management is not a good 
fit for many, or even most, policy management problems. The first wave 
of adaptive management scholarship was perhaps too optimistic in this 
regard, offering up adaptive management as a panacea to the 
intractability of front-end-style agency decisionmaking without 
carefully thinking through its own limitations. Swept up in this 
euphoria, policy managers may have applied adaptive management too 
aggressively and in ill-suited contexts, thus setting it up for failure. 
More recently, however, these lessons learned have led to a 
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reexamination of adaptive management theory to refine the contextual, 
practical, and normative conditions under which its use is appropriate. 
Accepting those conditions as the new starting point for applying 
adaptive management, we have examined the second reason for 
adaptive management failure—the front-end-focused requirements of 
conventional administrative procedure. Adaptive management and 
conventional administrative procedure form a classic square-peg, 
round-hole mismatch that has captured the attention of many adaptive 
management theorists. The now widely held perception is that three 
deeply rooted values of administrative procedure—public participation, 
judicial review, and finality—combine in conventional administrative 
law to erect a nearly impenetrable barrier to effective adaptive 
management. These values are perfectly appropriate for administrative 
procedure, and we do not propose abandoning them to make adaptive 
management possible. However, neither do we believe adaptive 
management must be stuck forever in a/m lite mode in order to preserve 
administrative procedure’s values. Rather, we follow through on 
suggestions that we and others have made for a specialized adaptive 
management track in administrative procedure that balances the needs 
of adaptive management with the values of administrative law. 
Our proposed adaptive management track is the first detailed 
blueprint for a new legal structure to match adaptive management’s 
decisionmaking structure. Recognizing that some tradeoffs are 
inevitable, we have sought to retain the core values of administrative 
law to the maximum extent possible in a procedural framework that 
allows agencies to engage in true adaptive management. However, to 
avoid a/m lite, we have simultaneously designed this new track to help 
ensure that agencies apply adaptive management effectively and only 
in appropriate settings. Finally, the adaptive management track’s 
processes, standards, and requirements should actively educate judges 
and the public as to how adaptive management can be as rigorous and 
transparent as traditional agency decisionmaking. 
We have made some tough decisions regarding how to redesign 
administrative law for adaptive management, and some of our choices 
may spark debate. We welcome that debate, because we consider our 
proposed Model Adaptive Management Procedure Act to be an open-
source work in progress and have every expectation that it can and will 
be improved. Indeed, we hope we have persuaded all adaptive 
management theorists and practitioners and all administrative law 
theorists and practitioners that they have a stake in the project of 
designing administrative law for adaptive management, and we hope 
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they will consider this Article an invitation to take our blueprint to their 
drawing boards for more work.195 
  
 
 195. We are pleased to be part of a process with that goal in mind, an interdisciplinary 
workshop effort spearheaded by Professor Barbara Cosens of the University of Idaho and Professor 
Lance Gunderson of Emory University that has received generous funding from the University of 
Maryland’s Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center (SESYNC).  
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Section 1: Definitions 
 
(A) “Abort indicators” means indicator statuses identified by the 
agency in compliance with §§ 3(B)(3)(h) and (5)(d) of this Act 
(and as made applicable to § 4(B)) and which signal that the 
agency should terminate immediately its current 
management measures. 
 
(B) “Adaptive management” means a decisionmaking process 
based on the structured and iterative implementation of 
management measures, with comprehensive monitoring of 
relevant system indicators, in the attempt to achieve specific 
management goals or objectives, reduce uncertainty, or 
increase knowledge about the system that an agency is 
charged with managing. 
 
(C) “Adaptive management plan,” when used without 
qualification, refers to an agency plan adopted pursuant to 
either § 3 or § 4 of this Act. 
 
(D) “Adaptive management track” or “adaptive management 
procedure track” means the agency procedures and 
requirements established in Sections 2 through 6 of this Act. 
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(E) “Administrative Procedure Act” or “APA” means 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 551–559, 701–706. [States would substitute the 
appropriate statute and definition.] 
 
(F) “Agency” means each authority of the Government of the 
United States [State of ____], whether or not it is subject to 
review by another agency, but does not include: 
 
(1) the President [Governor]; 
 
(2) the Congress [legislature]; 
 
(3) the courts of the United States or the states; 
 
(4) the governments of the territories or possessions of the 
United States; 
 
(5) the government of the District of Columbia. 
 
(G) “Complex system” or “system” means a policy-management 
context in which the relevant social, economic, technological, 
biological, physical, and environmental components are 
numerous, diverse, and interrelated; exhibit feedback 
between each other as conditions change; and adapt to 
stressors, perturbations, and management measures over 
time, based at least in part on how other components within 
the policy-management context respond.   
 
(H) “Finished indicators” means the indicator statuses identified 
by the agency in compliance with §§ 3(B)(3)(i) and (5)(D) of 
this Act (and as made applicable in § 4(B)) and which identify 
system responses that have met the goals for the agency’s 
current implementation of management measures. 
 
(I) “Implementation period” means the period in which the 
agency is implementing an adaptive management plan. 
 
(J) “Management action” or “agency management action” refers 
to larger-scale agency activity, the purpose of which is to 
guide a system toward the agency’s or legislation’s overall 
management objectives or goals for the system. 
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(K) “Management measure” means any specific or smaller-scale 
agency action taken as part of a management action in order 
to gather information about the system generally or a system 
component, test the system’s response to a proposed 
management action, pursue immediate management 
objectives for the system or one of its components, or reduce 
risks to or uncertainties about the system or one of its 
components. 
 
(L) “Person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or public or private organization other than an 
agency. 
 
(M) “Perturbation” means an event that disrupts the number, 
diversity, interrelations, feedback mechanisms, and 
adaptive capacities of the components of a complex system. 
 
(N) “Project” or “agency project” means a specific agency activity 
that redesigns, physically alters, or rearranges some or all of 
the components of a system. 
 
(O) “Rule” means the whole or a part of an agency statement of 
general or particular applicability and future effect designed 
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or 
describing the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of an agency. “Rule” includes an agency’s 
initial decision to follow the adaptive management track and 
all adaptive management plans. 
 
(P) “Rulemaking” means the agency process for formulating, 
amending, or repealing a rule. 
 
(Q) “Stressor” means a social, economic, technological, biological, 
physical, or environmental condition that acts over time to 
disrupt the number, diversity, interrelations, feedback 
mechanisms, or adaptive capacities of the components of a 
complex system. 
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Section 2: Agency Projects and Management Actions Subject to 
the Adaptive Management Procedure Track 
 
(A) Unless one of the sets of circumstances described below in 
subsections (C) or (D) is met, an agency must follow the 
normally applicable procedures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act [state equivalent statute] for the project or 
management action or category of projects or management 
actions at issue. However, if the requirements of subsections 
(C) or (D) are met, this Act supersedes the Administrative 
Procedure Act [state equivalent statute] for the project, 
management action, or category of projects or management 
actions made subject to this Act. 
 
(B) No agency may follow the adaptive management track 
created by this Act if Congress [the legislature] has 
prohibited the use of that track in the legislation authorizing 
the agency to implement or engage in the project or 
management action or category of projects or management 
actions at issue. 
 
(C) An agency must follow the adaptive management track 
created by this Act if Congress [the legislature] has expressly 
required the agency to follow that adaptive management 
track with respect to the project or management action or 
category of projects or management actions at issue. 
 
(D) An agency may follow the adaptive management track 
created by this Act with respect to a specific project or 
specific management action, or a category of projects or 
management actions, if: 
 
(1) Congress [The legislature] has not prohibited the use of 
the adaptive management track with respect to the 
specific project, management action, or category of 
projects or management actions; and 
 
(2) the agency finds, on the basis of the best evidence 
available, that the project, management action, or 
category of projects or management actions: 
 
a. deals with a complex system; 
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b. involves a system for which the response to either 
stressors or management measures, or both, is 
difficult to predict, especially when development 
of more detailed information about the system 
could help future management actions and 
measures; 
 
c. is subject to unknowns or uncertainties about the 
system, its stressors, and/or best management 
practices; 
 
d. requires the agency to regulate or manage the 
complex system itself, or significant activities 
within or components of the system; 
 
e. sets a definable overall goal for the system’s 
management, or effectuates legislation or a rule 
that sets a definable overall goal or goals for the 
system’s management; 
 
f. provides or allows for identifiable indicators of 
progress and/or lack thereof toward the 
statutorily or regulatorily defined goal that can be 
reliably monitored and meaningfully measured; 
 
g. allows for multiple management options and 
measures, so that adaptive management could 
help refine the management measures that the 
agency uses in future iterations of a management 
plan or project oversight; and 
 
h. allows for observable system responses to 
stressors and/or management measures over ten 
years or less so that periodically reviewable 
adaptive management plans are possible. 
 
(E) If an agency chooses, pursuant to section (D), to follow the 
adaptive management track created by this Act for a specific 
project, management action, or category of projects or 
management actions, it shall promulgate that decision 
through the notice-and-comment (“informal”) rulemaking 
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procedures identified in 5 U.S.C. § 553 [state equivalent 
statute], except that the exceptions noted in that provision 
shall not apply to any decision made under this Section. 
Public participation shall be as allowed in 5 U.S.C. § 553 
[state equivalent statute]. Judicial review of the agency’s 
decision shall be as allowed in § 6 of this Act. 
 
Section 3: Initial Adaptive Management Plan 
 
(A) Procedures Applicable to the Creation of the Initial 
Adaptive Management Plan 
 
(1) For any project or management action or category of 
projects or management actions properly utilizing the 
adaptive management track, the agency shall establish 
an initial adaptive management plan using the notice-
and-comment (“informal”) rulemaking procedures of 5 
U.S.C. § 553 [state equivalent statute], except that the 
exceptions noted in that provision shall not apply to any 
decision made under this section. Judicial review of the 
initial adaptive management plan shall be as specified in 
§ 6 of this Act.   
 
(2) In addition, the agency shall, in designing its initial 
adaptive management plan, in providing public notice of 
its proposed initial adaptive management plan, and in 
providing opportunities for public comment on that 
proposed plan, make reasonable efforts to identify and 
offer reasonable opportunities for involvement to 
representatives of interested members of the public and 
relevant stakeholder groups. While the agency shall 
make reasonable efforts to invite and allow public 
participation from a balanced group of representatives of 
various aspects of the public interest in its project or 
management action or category of projects or 
management actions, the exact number of participating 
representatives and their final composition shall be left 
to the agency’s sound discretion.   
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(B) Components of the Initial Adaptive Management Plan  
 
Every initial adaptive management plan shall contain detailed 
findings and determinations regarding each of the following 
plan components: 
 
(1) Goals. The agency shall identify, as specifically as 
possible: 
 
a.  the overall management goal or goals for the system 
that it is managing; 
 
b. the overall management goal or goals for the project, 
management action, or category of projects or 
management actions that it is undertaking through 
the adaptive management track; 
 
c. the specific goals of the management measures that 
the agency will implement pursuant to its initial 
adaptive management plan; 
 
d. the relationships among (1), (2), and (3); and 
 
e. the relationships of each of (1), (2), and (3) to the 
relevant goals, objectives, requirements, and 
standards of the legislation that the agency is 
implementing through its project or management 
action or category of projects or management actions. 
 
(2) Threats to Goals. The agency shall identify, as 
specifically as possible: 
 
a. the existing and predicted stressors to the system 
that interfere with the management goal or goals for 
the system as a whole; for the project or management 
action or category of projects or management actions 
subject to the adaptive management track; and for 
the management measures to be implemented 
pursuant to the initial adaptive management plan; 
 
b. the existing and predicted threats to the system, or to 
any of the system’s components, that could 
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compromise the success of the management measures 
to be implemented;  
 
c. perturbations in the system that are occurring or 
might occur that could affect either the goal or the 
proposed management measures; 
 
d. the agency’s uncertainties regarding threats, 
stressors, and perturbations; and 
 
d. the means by which the agency will be able to identify 
and address actual interference with its management 
goals and management measures from the stressors, 
threats, and perturbations that the agency has 
identified. 
 
(3) Indicators for Monitoring. Using the best information 
available, the agency shall identify and explain: 
 
a. the system indicators that will or could reveal the 
existing and changing relationships among the 
agency’s management goals; threats, stressors, and 
perturbations of the system; and the agency’s 
proposed management measures; 
 
b. the indicators that the agency plans to monitor 
throughout its project or management action; 
 
c. the past status of those indicators (if known); 
 
d. the current status of those indicators;   
 
e. the desired final goal or status for each indicator; 
 
f. changes in indicator status that would indicate a 
positive change in the system being managed (i.e., a 
change that promotes the ultimate or immediate 
management goals) and at least one means of 
determining whether such changes are caused by the 
management measures that the agency has 
implemented;  
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g. changes in indicator status that would indicate a 
negative change in the system being managed (i.e., a 
change that retards the ultimate or immediate 
management goals) and at least one means of 
determining whether such changes are caused by the 
management measures that the agency has 
implemented; 
 
h. abort indicators—that is, threshold measurements or 
indicator statuses that, individually and collectively, 
indicate that the agency’s current management 
measures should be terminated and a new adaptive 
management plan adopted; and 
 
i. finished indicators—that is, threshold measurements 
or indicator statuses that, individually or collectively, 
signal that the agency’s management measures have 
achieved the system benefits that they were intended 
to achieve. 
 
(4) Monitoring Plan 
 
a. The agency shall describe in detail its plan for 
systematically and consistently monitoring its chosen 
indicators using a uniform and scientifically 
defensible methodology, including its plan for 
collecting and reporting data. The agency shall 
explain how its monitoring plan accounts for 
stressors, threats, and perturbations and how the 
monitoring plan accurately assesses the entire 
system being managed in a comprehensive fashion. 
 
b. The agency shall describe its plan for periodically 
releasing its monitoring data and reports on its 
implementation of the initial adaptive management 
plan to the public. The agency shall release all such 
data and reports to the public in a form that is both 
comprehensible to a lay citizen and utilizable by 
experts in the relevant field(s). Unless Congress [the 
legislature] specifies otherwise, the agency shall 
report its monitoring data to the public at least once 
every six months. Unless Congress [the legislature] 
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specifies otherwise, the agency shall report on its 
implementation of the initial adaptive management 
plan at least yearly. 
 
(5) Initial Management Measures. The agency shall 
describe in detail: 
 
a. the initial set of management measures that it 
intends to implement and its reasons for choosing 
those measures; 
 
b. the results that it expects from its initial 
management measures based on best information 
available; 
 
c. system or component responses that will induce the 
agency to adjust its management measures, with 
explanations of why such system responses justify 
adjustment the management measures and of how 
the agency will make such adjustments to its 
management measures;  
 
d. abort indicators—that is, threshold measurements or 
indicator statuses that, individually and collectively, 
signal that the agency’s current management 
measures should be terminated and a new adaptive 
management plan adopted; and 
 
e.  finished indicators—that is, system responses and 
achieved indicator statuses that, individually or 
collectively, signal that the agency’s management 
measures have achieved the system benefits that they 
were intended to achieve. 
 
(6) Data and Report Release Schedule. The agency shall 
specify a schedule for releasing monitoring data to the 
public, with data releases to occur no less frequently than 
once every six (6) months. Monitoring data shall be 
released in the form specified in § 3(B)(4). The agency 
shall also specify a schedule for reporting to the public on 
its progress in implementing its adaptive management 
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plan, with reports to issue no less frequently than once 
every year. 
 
(7) Implementation Period. The agency shall designate 
the appropriate implementation period for its adaptive 
management plan as follows: 
 
a. If Congress [the legislature] has specified an 
implementation period for the project, management 
action, or category of projects or management actions 
at issue, the agency shall adopt that implementation 
period and cite to the relevant legislation. 
 
b. If Congress [the legislature] has not specified an 
implementation period for the project, management 
action, or category of projects or management actions 
at issue, the agency shall specify and justify an 
appropriate implementation based on the nature of 
the project or management action and the nature and 
duration of the management measures to be 
implemented. However, unless Congress [the 
legislature] has expressly allowed for longer 
implementation periods, no implementation period 
shall last longer than five (5) years, unless the agency 
can justify a longer period through clear and 
convincing evidence that a longer period is objectively 
necessary to meet statutory goals and objectives and 
defined management plan objectives. 
 
(C) Duration of the Initial Adaptive Management Plan 
 
(1) The agency’s initial adaptive management plan shall 
remain active, and the agency shall continue to 
implement it, until the first of the following three 
termination points occurs: 
 
a. the achievement of abort indicators that the agency 
identified pursuant to §§ 3(B)(3)(h) and (5)(D), unless 
the agency can attribute those statuses to the 
occurrence of an unexpected and temporary 
perturbation to the system whose effects are not 
expected to be permanent or long lasting; or 
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b. the achievement of finished indicators that the 
agency identified pursuant to §§ 3(B)(3)(i) and (5)(E), 
unless the agency attributes or should attribute those 
statuses entirely or significantly to a cause other than 
its own management measures; or 
 
c. the ending of the implementation period that the 
agency identified pursuant to § 3(B)(6). 
 
(2) Notice of Termination. The agency shall publish notice 
of its intention to terminate the implementation of its 
initial adaptive management plan in the Federal 
Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of the 
agency’s decision is sought, the agency shall, at least 
thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) days 
after publication of the Federal Register termination 
notice, terminate implementation of the initial adaptive 
management plan and shall immediately proceed to 
adopt a new adaptive management plan pursuant to § 4 
of this Act. Judicial review of the agency’s decision to 
terminate shall be in accordance with § 6. 
 
(3) Judicial Review. Judicial review of the agency’s initial 
adaptive management plan shall be as specified in § 6. 
However, unless the requirements of § 5 are proven by 
clear and convincing evidence, there shall be no judicial 
review of the agency’s implementation of its finalized 
initial adaptive management plan. 
 
(4)  Other Statutes and Procedures Not Applicable. 
Unless specified in the legislation authorizing the agency 
to undertake its project or management activities, no 
other statutes, regulations, or executive orders shall be 
deemed to impose any additional requirements, 
substantive or procedural, on the agency’s creation or 
implementation of its initial adaptive management plan. 
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Section 4: Subsequent Adaptive Management Plans 
 
(A) An agency pursuing the adaptive management track with 
regard to a project, management action, or category of projects 
or management actions shall continue to adopt subsequent 
adaptive management plans until the agency can demonstrate 
that: 
 
(1) Congress [the legislature] has expressly and specifically 
required that the agency terminate the adaptive 
management track for the project, management action, 
or category of projects or management actions at issue; or 
 
(2) Congress [the legislature] required the agency to pursue 
the adaptive management track and the system has 
achieved the system status, indicator statuses, or 
management goals that Congress [the legislature] 
specified must be achieved in order for the adaptive 
management track to be terminated; or 
 
(3) the agency chose to pursue the adaptive management 
track and the agency’s management measures, 
management actions, and/or projects have generated all 
or a significant portion of the information required, 
resolved all or almost all of the management 
uncertainties, and stably achieved all of the management 
goals for the system; or 
 
(4) the agency chose to pursue the adaptive management 
track and 
 
a. repeated achievement of abort indicators; or 
 
b. significantly changed circumstances in the system; or 
 
c. significant new information about the system 
indicates that the agency’s initial decision to pursue 
adaptive management for this project or management 
action or category of projects or management actions 
was in error or that effective adaptive management 
has become impossible or impracticable to implement 
for this system. 
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(5) Any agency asserting that the circumstances of 
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) have been met must justify 
its decision to remove its project, management action, or 
category of projects or management actions from the 
adaptive management track through a notice-and-
comment (“informal”) rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553 [state statutory equivalent], except that the 
exceptions noted in that provision shall not apply to any 
decision made under this section.  
 
(5) Judicial review of an agency’s decision to remove a 
project, management action, or category of projects or 
management actions from the adaptive management 
track shall be in accordance with § 6 of this Act. 
 
(B) Adoption of Subsequent Adaptive Management Plans 
 
(1) Adoption through Rulemaking. The agency shall 
adopt any subsequent adaptive management plan using 
the notice-and-comment (“informal”) rulemaking 
procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553 [state statutory equivalent], 
except that the exceptions noted in that provision shall 
not apply to any decision made under this section. 
Judicial review of any subsequent adaptive management 
plan shall be as specified in § 6.   
 
(2) Public Participation. In addition, the agency shall, in 
designing any subsequent adaptive management plan, in 
providing public notice of its proposed plan, and in 
providing opportunities for public comment on that 
proposed plan, make reasonable efforts to identify and 
offer reasonable opportunities for involvement to 
representatives of interested members of the public and 
relevant stakeholder groups. While the agency shall 
make reasonable efforts to invite and allow public 
participation from a balanced group of representatives of 
various aspects of the public interest in its project or 
management action or category of projects or 
management actions, the exact number of participating 
representatives and their final composition shall be left 
to the agency’s sound discretion.  
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(3) Components of a Subsequent Adaptive 
Management Plan 
 
a. Every subsequent adaptive management plan shall 
contain all of the components specified in § 3(B) of this 
Act. 
 
b. In addition, each subsequent adaptive management 
plan shall also: 
 
(i) Evaluate the monitoring data collected for the 
project, management action, or category of 
projects or management actions, both in the 
most recent implementation of the adaptive 
management process and over the course of 
the entire adaptive management process. 
Such evaluation should indicate whether the 
agency is making progress toward 
management goals and, if so, at what rate; 
analyze failures of progress; identify stressors, 
perturbations, or unexpected events that have 
affected the achievement of management 
objectives; and indicate whether the agency 
can confidently conclude that changes in 
indicator statuses are the result of the 
agency’s management measures. The agency 
shall also consider whether new monitoring 
methodologies are appropriate, but if it 
chooses to adopt such new methodologies, it 
shall ensure that data already collected will be 
compatible with and comparable to data 
collected pursuant to the new methodologies. 
 
(ii) Based on the data evaluation required in 
subparagraph (i), identify and explain any 
changes to the previous adaptive management 
plan or plans in light of new information, 
increased understanding of the system being 
managed, increased or decreased risks, 
increased or decreased uncertainties, 
significant changes to the system or its 
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components, identification of the need to 
include more or different monitored 
indicators, or changes to the authorizing 
legislation. The agency must also justify any 
changes to its management goals and 
objectives with reference to its authorizing 
legislation. 
 
(iii) Propose new management measures for the 
next implementation period, explaining why 
those management measures are appropriate, 
desirable, or required. 
 
(C) Duration of Each Subsequent Adaptive Management 
Plan 
 
(1) Each subsequent adaptive management plan shall 
remain active, and the agency shall continue to 
implement it, until the first of the following three 
termination points occurs: 
 
a. the achievement of the abort indicators identified 
pursuant to §§ 3(B)(3)(h) and (5)(D), as made 
applicable to this section, unless the agency can 
attribute those statuses to the occurrence of an 
unexpected and temporary perturbation to the 
system whose effects are not expected to be 
permanent or long lasting; or 
 
b. the achievement of the finished indicator statuses 
identified pursuant to §§ 3(B)(3)(i) and (5)(E), as 
made applicable to this section, unless the agency 
attributes or should attribute those statuses entirely 
or significantly to a cause other than its own 
management measures; or 
 
c. the ending of the implementation period that the 
agency identified pursuant to § 3(B)(6), as made 
applicable to this section. 
 
(2) Notice of Termination. The agency shall publish notice 
of its intention to terminate the implementation of its 
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current adaptive management plan in the Federal 
Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of the 
agency’s decision is sought, the agency shall, at least 
thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) days 
after publication of the Federal Register termination 
notice, terminate implementation of the adaptive 
management plan and shall immediately proceed to 
adopt a new adaptive management plan pursuant to this 
section. Judicial review of the agency’s decision to 
terminate shall be in accordance with § 6. 
 
(3) Judicial Review. Judicial review of any subsequent 
adaptive management plan adopted by the agency shall 
be as specified in § 6. However, unless the requirements 
of § 5 are proven through clear and convincing evidence, 
there shall be no judicial review of the agency’s 
implementation of any finalized subsequent adaptive 
management plan. 
 
(4) Other Statutes and Procedures Not Applicable. 
Unless expressly made applicable in the legislation 
authorizing the agency to undertake its project or 
management activities, no other statutes, regulations, or 
executive orders shall be deemed to impose any 
additional requirements, substantive or procedural, on 
the agency’s creation or implementation of any 
subsequent adaptive management plan. 
 
Section 5: Termination of Adaptive Management Plan 
Implementation Because of Emergency Circumstances 
 
 (A) This section applies only during the implementation period for 
a finalized adaptive management plan adopted pursuant to 
either § 3 or § 4. 
 
(B) If the implementing agency concludes on the basis of its 
ongoing monitoring data that the system has achieved the 
abort indicators specified in the adaptive management plan, 
the agency shall, unless the agency can attribute those 
statuses to the occurrence of an unexpected and temporary 
perturbation to the system whose effects are not expected to be 
permanent or long lasting, immediately publish notice of its 
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intention to terminate the implementation of that plan in the 
Federal Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of 
the agency’s decision is sought, the agency shall, at least 
thirty-one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) days after 
publication of the Federal Register termination notice, 
terminate implementation of the adaptive management plan 
and shall immediately proceed to adopt a new adaptive 
management plan pursuant to § 4 of this Act. Judicial review 
of the agency’s decision to terminate shall be in accordance 
with § 6. 
 
(C) If the agency can demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that: 
 
(1)  the system has been subjected to a severe disruption that 
was not identified or anticipated in the adaptive 
management plan. “Severe disruptions” are limited to 
events such as natural disasters, economic collapses, or 
acts of war or terrorism; and 
 
(2) as a result of the severe disruption, all or a significant 
portion of the informational bases that informed the 
agency’s adaptive management plan are no longer true or 
accurate, 
 
the agency may immediately publish notice of its intention to 
terminate the implementation of that plan in the Federal 
Register [state equivalent]. Unless judicial review of the 
agency’s decision is sought, the agency shall, at least thirty-
one (31) days but not more than ninety (90) days after 
publication of the Federal Register termination notice, 
terminate implementation of the adaptive management plan 
and shall immediately proceed to adopt a new adaptive 
management plan pursuant to § 4 of this Act. Judicial review 
of the agency’s decision to terminate shall be in accordance 
with § 6. 
 
(D) Any person may file a petition for mandamus in the U.S. 
District Court for the district in which the agency project or 
management action is occurring [state court], or in any U.S. 
District Court for a district in which the agency may be found 
1 - Craig&Ruhl PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/10/2014  4:27 PM 
2014] ADMIN LAW & ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 81 
[alternative state court], if the petitioner can prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that:  
 
(1)  the system that the agency is managing achieved the 
abort indicators specified in the currently applicable 
adaptive management plan;  
 
(2) the system’s achievement of the abort indicators cannot 
be attributed in whole or significant part to the 
occurrence of an unexpected and temporary perturbation 
to the system whose effects are not expected to be 
permanent or long lasting; 
 
(3)  the agency has not terminated and is not in the process 
of terminating its implementation of the adaptive 
management plan; 
 
(4) the petitioner gave notice to the agency at least sixty (60) 
days before filing a mandamus action pursuant to this 
subsection that the system had achieved the abort 
indicators, with supporting documentation; and 
 
(5)  the system continues to exhibit the abort indicators 
identified in the adaptive management plan. 
 
Upon a finding by the court that the petitioner has proven each 
of these requirements by clear and convincing evidence, the 
court shall order the agency to terminate its current adaptive 
management plan and proceed to the adoption of a subsequent 
adaptive management plan in accordance with § 4. 
 
(E) Any person may file a petition for mandamus in the U.S. 
District Court for the district in which the agency project or 
management action is occurring [state court], or in any U.S. 
District Court for a district in which the agency may be found 
[alternative state court], if the petitioner can prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that:  
 
(1)  the system that the agency is managing has been 
subjected to a severe disruption that was not identified 
or anticipated in the currently applicable adaptive 
management plan. “Severe disruptions” are limited to 
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events such as natural disasters, economic collapses, or 
acts of war or terrorism; and 
 
(2) as a direct result of the severe disruption, all or a 
significant portion of the informational bases that 
informed the agency’s adaptive management plan are no 
longer true or accurate; and 
 
(3) there is no valid reason for the agency to continue to 
implement its current adaptive management plan; and 
 
(4)  the agency has not terminated and is not in the process 
of terminating its implementation of the adaptive 
management plan; and 
 
(5) the petitioner gave notice to the agency at least sixty (60) 
days before filing its mandamus action that the system 
had been subject to a severe disruption that warranted a 
new adaptive management plan, with supporting 
documentation; and 
 
(6)  the system continues to be disrupted as a direct result of 
the severe disruption identified. 
 
The court shall presume that no unanticipated severe 
disruption has occurred and that neither termination of the 
plan’s implementation nor mandamus is warranted. Upon a 
finding by the court that the petitioner has proven each of 
these requirements by clear and convincing evidence, the court 
shall order the agency to terminate its current adaptive 
management plan and proceed to the adoption of a subsequent 
adaptive management plan in accordance with § 4. 
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Section 6: Judicial Review 
 
 (A) If an agency chooses, pursuant to § 2(D) of this Act, to follow 
the adaptive management track when Congress does not 
explicitly require the agency to do so, or if any agency chooses 
pursuant to § 4(A) of this Act to remove a project, management 
action, or category of projects or management action from the 
adaptive management track, any person may seek judicial 
review of the agency’s final rule promulgating that decision in 
the United States Court of Appeals [state court] for: (1) the 
circuit in which the specific project or management action will 
occur, if the agency’s decision pertains to only one specific 
project or management action; or (2) any circuit [district] in 
which the agency is found. Challenges to the agency’s decision 
must be filed in the appropriate Court of Appeals [state court] 
within ninety (90) days of the publication in the Federal 
Register [state publication] of the agency’s final rule 
announcing its decision. The reviewing court shall hold 
unlawful and set aside the agency’s decision to follow the 
adaptive management track or to terminate the adaptive 
management track if that decision is found to be: 
 
(1)  contrary to Congress’s [the legislature’s] intent that the 
project, management action, or category of projects or 
management actions not be placed on the adaptive 
management track or not be removed from the adaptive 
management track, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law; 
 
(2) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; 
 
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right; 
 
(4) without observance of procedure required by law; or 
 
(5) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity. 
 
(B) Any challenge to an agency’s initial adaptive management 
plan adopted pursuant to § 3 of this Act, and any challenge to 
an agency’s subsequent adaptive management plan adopted 
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pursuant to § 4 of this Act must be filed with thirty (30) days 
of the publication of the final Federal Register notice for that 
plan in the United States Court of Appeals [state court] for (1) 
the circuit in which the specific project or management action 
will occur, if the agency’s decision pertains to only one specific 
project or management action; or (2) any circuit [district] in 
which the agency is found. The reviewing court shall hold 
unlawful and set aside the agency’s adaptive management 
plan if that plan is found to be: 
 
(1)  contrary to Congress’s [the legislature’s] goals or 
management specifications for the system, project, 
management action, or category of projects or 
management actions; 
 
(2) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; 
 
(3) without observance of procedure required by law; or 
 
(4) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity. 
 
In addition, the court in its sound discretion may award costs 
and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.  
 
(C) An agency’s implementation of any adaptive management plan 
shall be deemed committed to agency discretion by law. 
Judicial review of such implementation shall not be allowed 
except as provided in § 5 of this Act and by subsections (D), (E), 
(F), and (G) of this section. In addition, except as provided in 
subsection (G) of this section, no court shall award costs or 
attorney fees to challengers/plaintiffs in any action brought to 
challenge or terminate an agency’s implementation of its 
adaptive management plan.  
 
(D) Petitioning parties seeking to terminate an agency’s 
implementation of an adaptive management plan must 
proceed in accordance with § 5(D) or § 5(E) of this Act. The 
reviewing court shall presume that judicial review is 
inappropriate and unavailable, and it shall construe the 
mandamus exceptions provided in § 5 narrowly. 
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(E) Any person may challenge an agency’s decision to terminate 
the implementation of an adaptive management plan 
pursuant to §§ 3(C)(1), 4(C)(1), 5(B) or 5(C) of this Act within 
thirty (30) days of the agency’s publication in the Federal 
Register [state equivalent] of its decision to terminate in the 
U.S. District Court for the district in which the agency project 
or management action is occurring [state court], or in any U.S. 
District Court for a district in which the agency may be found 
[alternative state court]. The court shall reverse the agency’s 
decision to terminate and shall reinstate the previously 
operative adaptive management plan if the agency’s decision 
to terminate was not supported by clear and convincing 
evidence that the requirements of §§ 3(C)(1), 4(C)(1), 5(B) or 
5(C) had been met. 
 
(F) If an agency fails to release monitoring data or to publish an 
implementation report within sixty (60) days of the date 
specified in the adaptive management plan, any person may 
sue for the limited and exclusive purpose of compelling 
production of those data or that report. The complaint may be 
filed no sooner than sixty (60) days following the date specified 
in the adaptive management plan. The complaint may not be 
filed more than one hundred twenty (120) days after the date 
specified in the adaptive management plan to compel the 
release of a set of monitoring data or more than one hundred 
eighty (180) days after the date specified in the adaptive 
management plan to compel the release of an implementation 
report. In no case may a complaint be filed under this section 
if the implementation period for the current adaptive 
management plan has expired. Lawsuits initiated under this 
section shall be filed in the U.S. District Court for the district 
in which the agency project or management action is occurring 
[state court], or in any U.S. District Court for a district in 
which the agency may be found [alternative state court]. The 
court’s review shall be strictly limited to (1) determining 
whether the agency has failed to release monitoring data or an 
implementation report according to the schedule specified in 
the current adaptive management plan; and (2) if so, ordering 
the agency to release such data or such implementation report 
within thirty (30) days of the court’s order. 
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(G) If an adaptive management plan specifies an implementation 
period of three (3) years or longer, and the agency has taken 
absolutely no action to implement the plan for at least two (2) 
years, any person may challenge the agency’s absolute lack of 
implementation in the U.S. District Court for the district in 
which the agency project or management action is occurring 
[state court], or in any U.S. District Court for a district in 
which the agency may be found [alternative state court]. The 
court shall dismiss the lawsuit immediately upon the agency’s 
proffer of evidence that:  
 
(1)  the implementation period will or did not last longer than 
three (3) years; or 
 
(2)  the adaptive management plan at issue has terminated 
or is being terminated; or 
 
(3)  the agency is engaged in ongoing monitoring or data 
collection in accordance with the adaptive management 
plan; or 
 
(4)  the agency has released monitoring data to the public at 
least once in the last two (2) years; or 
 
(5)  the agency has published an implementation report at 
least once in the last two (2) years; or 
 
(6)  the agency has implemented or has begun to implement 
a management activity specified in the adaptive 
management plan at least once in the last two (2) years; 
or 
 
(7)  the agency has undertaken any other activity within the 
last two (2) years that indicates that it has not completely 
abandoned the adaptive management plan.  
 
Any agency securing a dismissal under this section shall be 
entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorney fees, 
and, in the court’s discretion, the plaintiff(s) may be subject to 
sanctions for bringing a frivolous lawsuit. If the 
implementation period is three (3) years or longer, the 
adaptive management plan has not been terminated and is not 
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in the process of being terminated, and the agency proffers no 
evidence of active implementation as specified, the court shall, 
in its sound discretion, either (1) order the agency to 
implement the adaptive management plan; (2) terminate the 
current adaptive management plan and order the agency to 
adopt a new adaptive management plan; or (3) terminate the 
current adaptive management plan and terminate the 
agency’s participation in the adaptive management track. 
Plaintiff(s) securing such an order under this section shall be 
entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
